Re X- the never-ending story.



Charles J has today (25 September) handed down the judgment in Re NRA [2015] EWCOP 59, sometimes described as Re X (2).




The case concerned welfare orders sought in respect of ten individuals whose care arrangements involved deprivation of their liberty. He described it as part of the “fall out” from the majority judgment in P v Cheshire West.


The case considered the procedural safeguards needed and at the heart of the case was the question as to whether P should be joined as a party. The Re X litigation had thrown up contradictory obiter views in respect of applications (which were referred to as “judicial detention” cases) that were seen as uncontentious. The President of the Court of Protection had delivered two judgments (Re X (1) and Re X (2)). The Court of Appeal judgment had concluded that the initial Re X judgments had been ultra vires. Therefore the Court of Appeal did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal, but had strongly indicated what they would have done had they been able to do so, and all three judges considered that P should be a party.   The Court of Appeal had not considered ancillary issues such as, if P is always a party, who should act as litigation friend and whether there should be an oral hearing.


The cases were described as examples of “benevolent” arrangements that “many find difficult to characterize as a deprivation of liberty” (taken from the comments of Baroness Hale at para 10 in P v Cheshire West).


Charles J noted that in Cheshire West Baroness Hale referred to the need for “periodic checks” and suggested that these should not be stigmatizing. He cast doubt on whether this reflected the experience of family carers and noted that any simplified solution should recognize the central role of families and carers [para 12].


His approach was to consider what was required to satisfy requirements of common law and Convention rights, which he grouped under the heading “the safeguards” [para 24] and then what procedural steps would satisfy these in a practical effective and speedy way in cases of deprivation of liberty. Identifying the Safeguards entailed considering alternative ways of guaranteeing procedural fairness (“the requirements”) and whether these were likely to work (“the Effects”) [para 25].


Charles J acknowledged that the instinctive reaction of lawyers in England and wales would be that P should be a party in all cases in the Court of Protection because he will be affected and bound by them [para 34]; but that consideration of the fact that the overwhelming majority of cases relate to property and affairs and are uncontentious indicates that fairness does not always require this. He applied to the Court of Protection the comment in Re R (Care; Disclosure; Nature of Proceedings) [2002] 1 FLR 755 that family cases have both adversarial and investigatory aspects [para 36]. The requirements of fairness will be different depending on whether a case is or is not contentious. An independent check on each of the property and affairs cases – and deputyship applications- would be disproportionate; hence the presumption that P need not be a party in such cases.


The purpose of ss5 and 6 MCA was again to allow day to day decisions to be made by those involved in caring for P [para 40]. The test for such interventions (ie, is the intervention the least restrictive and in P’s best interests) is not different in substance from the test to be applied in Article 5 cases [para 41].


Moreover some adults with capacity are objectively deprived of their liberty by their care packages but have no alternative but to accept this as they lack the resources to bring judicial review proceedings [para 42].


Charles J accepted that a balance needed to be struck in order to acknowledge the risk that an apparently uncontentious package in P’s best interests may not in fact be either; and acknowledged the advantage for P of an outside check [para 44].


In many cases the appointment of a family member or friend, or the Official Solicitor will add little value other than to confirm the accuracy of information provided (and in some cases to uncover inaccuracies) [para 51].


Reviewing the statutory scheme under the MCA and DOLS Charles J noted that the Court does not determine whether P should or should not be deprived of his liberty but makes a determination of his best interests the corollary of which may be a deprivation of his liberty and thus require additional safeguards eg reviews and whether P should be a party [para 73]. The existence of a deprivation of liberty may further have relevance to the question of damages for breach of Article 5.


Although the Official Solicitor had agreed to accept an appointment to act under specific funding arrangements in 8 of the 10 cases (whereby some solicitors had agreed to carry out some preliminary work pro bono) the Official Solicitor had indicated that he would reach saturation point in the future absent additional funding.


Under the heading “legal aid” Charles J noted that the Lord Chancellor had been reviewing the impact of Cheshire West and the House of Lords recommendations to end the disparity between those detained under DOLS and those detained under the MCA for some time [para 95]. He noted that full representation would only be granted if there was to be or was likely to be a hearing [99 onwards] and rejected the suggestion that an oral hearing was always necessary and should not be listed simply to access legal representation.


He took the view that legal help would not be available once proceedings were issued and P was represented by a litigation friend [91] and even if this were incorrect the means requirements precluded this as a source of funding in most cases.


He concluded (correctly) that legal aid will only be a solution if the case proves contentious and requires a hearing.


He did not agree that a rule 3A representative would resolve the issue [116] as this did not provide P with the status of a party. He rejected the Law Society’s submission that an ALR could never be appointed in a case involving deprivation of liberty [117].


He noted the impact on resources of the Court of Protection of the joinder of P in all cases, as well as on the resources of litigation friends [124].


He concluded that a litigation friend need not always act through a solicitor. A litigation friend is not a party [143]. In comments which emphasise the rapprochement between the Court of Protection and the Mental Health Tribunal worlds, he referred to his judgment in YA v CNWL, where he likened the role of the appointed representative under TPR 11(7)(b) to a litigation friend who may sometimes have to over-ride P’s wishes. He returns to this analogy when considering the role of the RPR.


At paragraphs 158 onwards Charles J considered the availability of family or friends as potential litigation friends to P. This can be replete with difficulties where there is family conflict (as in Re UF) or a dissonance between the views of P and of his family (as in Re AJ).


In a comment which sits uncomfortably with the judgement of Baker J in Re AJ, Charles J does not agree that the RPR should challenge a standard authorization whenever P objects; but instead should decide whether to issue at all and then should only advance arguable points (again analogous to his views about the role of the Tribunal representative in YA): para 171-2.


Part 3 of the judgment contains the discussion on the question whether the Requirements and the Effects mean that P must be a party to ALL applications for welfare orders seeking a deprivation of liberty. He concludes that the answer is “no” and that he prefers the obiter reasoning of the President to the Court of Appeal: para 177.


This is because:


  • what fairness requires will depend on the context [para 187] where Charles J noted that in para 57 of the judgment in Winterwerp the court concluded that an Article 5(4) compliant process must “have a judicial character and gives the individual concerned guarantees appropriate to the kind of detention in question” [para 187 (iii)].
  • The comments in RP vUK about the margin of appreciation, which takes into account “all relevant factors” including the nature and complexity of the issue and what was at stake for P” [para 187 (v)].

He acknowledged the need to protect “the very essence” of Article 5 rights which will vary with each case [para 190].


The heart of the judgment is Charles J’s conclusions as to the “essence” of the rights guaranteed by Article 5.


These are set out below:

“The combination of the requirements of Article 5(1) and 5(4) to the initial decision making and the challenge of the decision made (see paragraph 182 above) shows that, when in reliance of Article 5(1)(e) there is or is going to be an objective deprivation of liberty, the essence of Article 5 is to provide safeguards that put a person who lacks the relevant capacity in a sufficiently equivalent position to a person who has that capacity and so who could himself:

  1. consider, test and decide between competing provisions for his care or treatment,
  2. consent to one of them, and
  • keep under review and challenge the arrangements put in place.

This gives rise to the need for a process that is directed to ensuring that the steps referred to in paragraph 164 (i) to (iii) above are adequately carried out or that their subject matter is adequately investigated by the court. Namely:

  • the elicitation and communication to the court of P’s wishes and feelings and the matters referred to in s. 4(6) of the MCA without causing P any or any unnecessary distress,
  • the critical examination from the perspective of P’s best interests, and with a detailed knowledge of P, the pros and cons of a care package, and whether it is the least restrictive available option, and
  • the review of the implementation of the care package and changes in P’s behaviour or health.

and in his view require


  • elicitation of P’s wishes and feelings and the matters referred to in s4(6) MCA “without causing P any or any unnecessary distress”;
  • critical examination of the pros and cons of the care plan from the perspective of P’s best interests and in the context of the least restructive alternative and
  • the review of its implementation and changes in P’s behaviour and health.”


The minimum standards required of procedural safeguards will vary from case to case and within the exceptions to Article 5, and within the issues which arise in each case [para 193]. He considers this consistent with Baroness Hale’s comments about the possibility of simplifying the safeguards in Cheshire West [para 195] which support the proposition that the COP rules can be applied flexibly.


Under the heading “Flaws and gaps in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal” [para 197 onwards] he criticizes the reasoning of Black LJ for treating “all deprivations of liberty as being effectively the same for the purpose of the application of the procedural safeguards” [para 205]. He distinguishes cases where deprivation of liberty is authorized purely because of P’s best interests from secure accommodation cases relating to children and these involve factors other than the paramountcy principle (such as risk to others, which also features in decisions to detain under the MHA); and this is relevant to the minimum standards question.


Nor does the Court of Appeal recognize that the relevant comparator is with an adult with capacity who consents to the deprivation of liberty because this is the role of the court under s16 (circular!- possibly an argument for reduced safeguards on review).



At para 215 Charles J refers to his conclusion in YA at paras 39-41 that legal representation is not a minimum requirement in all cases. He considered that in many cases family members will be best placed to act as litigation friends and provides examples from the 10 cases before him.[219-224].


At paragraphs 223- 229 Charles J considers the information provided in the streamlined procedure and how this could be improved. He recommends additional information, such as- importantly- details of when supervision is provided; use of sedation or assistive technology; what would happen if P tried to leave, and statements from those providing care to P [225].


He suggested that information should also be provided about any tenancy agreement; the participation of family and friends; and why it is considered that the case can be dealt with on the papers.


As litigation friends do not need to instruct solicitors; and as a hearing is not needed in all cases, there is very little benefit in making P a party and appointing a family member as a litigation friend rather than as a Rule 3A representative and where this is an available option this will provide P with the requisite safeguards [231-2]. There should be a direction to keep the care package under review. He considers that this can reliably secure P’s participation without making P a party and thus falls within the exceptions to the need for party status identified by Black LJ in the Re X judgment.


Where there is not a family member or friend who can be appointed this should not require joinder of P but instead the court should consider the use of s49 reports and summonses; and the “much better solution” of the Secretary of State for justice of appointing “Rule 3A representatives identified by the local authority”. He urged the Secretary of State and local authorities to consider “urgently” how this solution can be provided on the ground and recognized that it this not available this will need to be addressed [265-7].


He expresses the view that his conclusions do not discriminate for the purposes of Article 14 [para 268].


His conclusions are summarized in 269:


“A brief summary of my conclusions is that:

  • P does not have to be a party to all applications for welfare orders sought to authorise, and which when they are made will authorise, a deprivation of P’s liberty caused by the implementation of the care package on which the welfare order is based.
  • In two of the test cases before me I have made orders that reflect that conclusion and my conclusion that the procedural safeguards required by Article 5 are (and are best) provided in those cases by appointing a parent of P as P’s Rule 3A representative. As such, that parent as a continuation of the dedicated and devoted support given by P’s family to P and directed to promoting P’s best interests, in a balanced way, can best provide (a) the court with the information it requires about the care package and P, and (b) P’s participation in the proceedings. Also, that parent can and in my view will monitor the implementation of the care plan and so initiate any challenge to it or review of it that the parent considers should be made in P’s best interests.
  • I do not have a test case before me in which (a) P has not been joined as a party and the Official Solicitor has not agreed to act as P’s litigation friend, and (b) the appointment of a family member or friend as P’s Rule 3A representative without joining P as a party is not an available option. Such a test case or cases should be listed for hearing.
  • In contrast to the Court of Appeal in Re X and subject to further argument in such a test case or cases, I consider that the way in which the Court of Protection can at present best obtain further information and P’s participation in such cases is for it to exercise its investigatory jurisdiction to obtain information through obtaining s. 49 reports or through the issue of a witness summonses. This keeps the matter under the control of the court rather than invoking the necessity of appointing a litigation friend with the problems and delays that history tells us this entails and will entail and I have concluded is, or shortly will be, not fit for purpose.
  • I do not for a moment suggest that absent further resources being provided there will not be problems and delays in taking the course referred to in paragraph (4). Also, and importantly, I recognise that it would be focused on Article 5(1) and would not provide for monitoring on the ground until it is repeated from time to time for that purpose. But, the appointment of a litigation friend will also not provide that monitoring.
  • In such cases the argument advanced by the Secretary of State before me that a Rule 3A representative identified by the local authority be appointed shows that if this was a practically available option it would replicate the input that I have decided can be provided by an appropriate family member or friend and so satisfy the procedural safeguards required by Article 5 and common law fairness in non-controversial cases without joining P as a party.
  • That replication is an obvious solution that will provide the necessary safeguards more efficiently and at less expense than either
    1. the making of orders for s. 49 reports and the issuing of witness summonses perhaps coupled with more frequent reviews, or
    2. joining P as a party.
  • So I urge the Secretary of State and local authorities to consider urgently, and in any event before a test case or cases of this type are before the court, how this solution can be provided on the ground.”



This is a decision focussed on practical solutions. It is of note however that much reliance is placed on the availability of resources – the Rule 3A representatives. There will of course be cases where family members and friends are able and willing to step into this role. There will be many other cases where P is unbefriended. In these cases, the court has two options. The first is to make use of s49 reports and the power to issue witness summonses to elicit the required information. This appears quite onerous, and can also be contentious- see the recent decision in RS. The second is the solution identified by the Secretary of State which is to appoint Rule 3A representatives “identified by the local authority.”

There must be some doubt as to the ability of local authorities- already struggling to meet their obligations to provide IMCA and Care Act advocacy- to conjure up another group of individuals who will step in and provide the safeguards needed. Nor is there any consideration given as to how these representatives will be funded.

The comments on YA and Re AJ can be seen as obiter as both judgments related to quite different scenarios. However it is noteable that in paragraph 145 Charles J appears to go further than he went in the YA judgment by expressly referring to the need for litigation friends (and by analogy Rule 11(7) representatives) to over-ride the wishes and feelings of patients without capacity.

It is worth remembering that those appointed as “Rule 3A” representatives may ask for directions under COPR 148A, which could include a request for P to be joined and a litigation friend appointed.

The possible use of “accredited legal representatives” (ALRs) if they become available was dealt with quickly at paragraph 117. There is currently no such panel of ALRs (although there is also no cohort of rule 3A representatives to be called on by local authorities). This would have been a practical solution at least in cases where P is entitled to legal aid. It is noted that in Re PD Baker J encouraged the possible use of ALRs in Schedule 3 cases. ALRs appointed in Re X types cases would have been well placed quickly to scrutinise and identify which cases require contested hearings and which really are uncontentious.















“Neary 2,” or making Article 5(4) real

In an extremely important judgment handed down on 11 February, AJ v A Local Authority [2015] EWCOP 5, Baker J has given detailed guidance as to the heavy burden that is placed upon local authorities in making sure that those deprived of their liberty in care homes (and, by extension, hospitals) are afforded effective access to the Court of Protection so as to secure their rights under Article 5(4) ECHR.   He has also confirmed again the importance of taking appropriate steps in advance where it is clear (or should be clear) that a person will be deprived of their liberty.

For those in a hurry, Baker J gave at the conclusion a series of wider lessons, which I reproduce here, although this is no substitute either for reading the balance of this note or – more importantly – the judgment itself.

“113. First, I emphasise that the scheme of the DOLS is that, in the vast majority of cases, it should be possible to plan in advance so that a standard authorisation can be obtained before the deprivation of liberty begins. It is only in exceptional cases, where the need for the deprivation of liberty is so urgent that it is in the best interests of the person for it to begin while the application is being considered, that a standard authorisation need not be sought before the deprivation begins.

114. Secondly, professionals need to be on their guard to look out for cases where vulnerable people are admitted to residential care ostensibly for respite when the underlying plan is for a permanent placement without proper consideration as to their Article 5 rights.

115. Thirdly, a RPR should only be selected or confirmed by a BIA where he or she satisfies not only the criteria in regulation 3 of the Mental Capacity (Deprivation of Liberty: Appointment of Relevant Person’s Representative) Regulations 2008 but also the requirements of paragraph 140 of Schedule A1 of the MCA. This requires that the BIA not only checks that the facts set out in regulation 3 are satisfied but also carries out an analysis and reaches a judgment as to whether the prospective representative would, if appointed, (a) maintain contact with the relevant person; (b) represent the relevant person in matters relating to or connected with the Schedule and (c) support the relevant person in matters relating to or connected with the Schedule.

116. Fourthly, the local authority is under an obligation to satisfy itself that a person selected for appointment as RPR meets the criteria in regulation 3 and in paragraph 140 of Schedule A1. If the local authority concludes that the person selected for appointment does not meet the criteria, it should refer the matter back to the BIA. 

117. Fifthly, it is likely to be difficult for a close relative or friend who believes that it is in P’s best interests to move into residential care, and has been actively involved in arranging such a move, into a placement that involves a deprivation of liberty, to fulfil the functions of RPR, which involve making a challenge to any authorisation of that deprivation. BIAs and local authorities should therefore scrutinise very carefully the selection and appointment of RPRs in circumstances which are likely to give rise to this potential conflict of interest.

118. Sixthly, an IMCA appointed under section 39 D must act with diligence and urgency to ensure that any challenge to an authorisation under schedule A 1 is brought before the court expeditiously. Failure to do so will lead to the evaporation of P’s Article 5 rights.

119. Seventhly, the appointment of a RPR and IMCA does not absolve the local authority from responsibility for ensuring that P’s Article 5 rights are respected. The local authority must monitor whether the RPR is representing and supporting P in accordance with the duty under paragraph 140 and, if not, consider terminating his appointment on the grounds that he is no longer eligible. The local authority must make sufficient resources available to assist an IMCA and keep in touch with the IMCA to ensure that all reasonable steps are being taken to pursue P’s Article 5 rights.

120. Finally, in circumstances where a RPR and an IMCA have failed to take sufficient steps to challenge the authorisation, the local authority should consider bringing the matter before the court itself. This is likely, however, to be a last resort since in most cases P’s Article 5 rights should be protected by the combined efforts of a properly selected and appointed RPR and an IMCA carrying out their duties with appropriate expedition.”


Although the principles set down by Baker J are of general application, the particular factual context in which they arose is of some importance, not least because they represent a not uncommon state of affairs.

An elderly lady, AJ, had lived for a considerable period of time in an annexe of the home of her niece and her husband (‘Mr and Mrs C’).   She developed vascular dementia and became increasingly dependent on others, in particular Mrs C.  She was, however, very reluctant to acknowledge her condition, and insistent that she could manage without any help.   In April 2013, she signed LPAs in respect of health and welfare and property and financial affairs naming Mr and Mrs C as donees.

At around this time, AJ was referred to social services by a psychiatric nurse. When a local authority case co-ordinator visited on 22nd April 2013, Mrs C raised the possibility of respite care for AJ to prevent the breakdown of the care arrangements.   In June 2013, Mrs C made it clear that she could not continue with her caring role in its current form as she and her husband had planned a fortnight’s holiday.   She said that she now felt that permanent residential care was required.   The local authority social worker offered to find the nearest suitable home for respite while Mr. and Mrs. C were away, and duly identified a home, X House, for that purpose.  It was clear that, in fact, it was hoped that if AJ settled she could remain in the care home on a permanent basis.

On 13 June, just before they went on holiday, Mr and Mrs C took AJ to X House. Upon arrival, she stated that she did not wish to be there and repeatedly asked to leave. No assessment under Schedule A1 to the MCA 2005 had been carried out prior to her arrival but an urgent authorisation under the Schedule was granted by the manager at X House on 14 June.  The urgent authorisation recorded inter alia that AJ had been placed at the home whilst her main carers, Mr and Mrs C, went on holiday for two weeks, “with a view to [AJ] staying here on a permanent basis”. On the same day, a request was made to the local authority as the supervisory body for a standard authorisation, which was granted for a period of 21 days because of the uncertainty of the situation.

Mr C was appointed AJ’s RPR, on the basis that AJ had a donee whose under the LPA permitted them to select a family member, friend of carer to be their RPR, that the donee had selected Mr C to act in that capacity and that he was eligible to be appointed.   It was clear at this stage that Mr C supported AJ continuing to be accommodated in a care home, even though it amounted to a deprivation of her liberty.  A s.39D IMCA was also appointed, a Mr R.

At the start of July 2013, AJ was moved to Y House, and remained there thereafter, subject to repeated standard authorisations.     Despite AJ’s known opposition to living at Y House, no legal challenge was made to the standard authorisations for several months.  As Baker J noted, “[t]he reasons for this failure lie at the heart of this case” (paragraph 18).   A critical reason was the lack of effective communication between Mr C and Mr R.

When Mr R and Mr C finally spoke in November 2013 Mr R realised that Mr. C was not going to initiate proceedings and after further conversations with his manager he agreed to act as her litigation friend and instruct solicitors to make an application to the Court on her behalf.  Proceedings were eventually issued in December 2013, challenging the standard authorisation made in July 2013.    Mr R was replaced in March 2014 as AJ’s litigation friend by the Official Solicitor.  Although ultimately the substantive challenge under s.21A MCA 2005 was not actively pursued, in view of evidence as to a deterioration in AJ’s condition and behaviour, and to the fact that there was no domiciliary care agency willing to offer to provide care, the Official Solicitor (1) raised concerns as to the extent to which the care plan accurately reflected the type and degree of physical interventions being used; and (2) pursued a claim for a declaration under s.7 HRA 1998 that AJ’s rights under Article 5(1), 5(4) and 8 ECHR had been breached (but not a claim for damages).     In order to determine the claim, Baker J conducted a hearing in May 2014 at which he heard oral evidence from Mr R, Mr C and the local authority’s BIA, Ms G, and then subsequently sought (and received) extensive written submissions, inter alia, on the effect of the Re X judgment).


As a preliminary issue, Baker J addressed the question of the use of restraint and its documentation.    It became clear that the level of physical restraint being used by carers in Y House was greater than acknowledged in the care plan (and indeed, even in an amended care plan).

As Baker J noted:

25.  In supplemental submissions, Ms Butler-Cole on behalf of the Official Solicitor submitted that in any case in which physical restraint is used in the care of an incapacitated adult, any physical intervention, whether considered to amount to “restraint” or not, should be recorded in the care plan maintained by the service provider and monitored by the statutory body responsible for commissioning the person’s care. Furthermore, precise details of all physical interventions should be ascertained and documented as part of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards process or indeed any best interest assessment from direct discussion with care staff implementing the interventions.

 agree. In this case, whilst there may at one stage have been a discrepancy between the care plan and what was actually being provided, I am now satisfied that the local authority has addressed this issue in its amended plan. If, however, any further issue arises, or any party seeks any further declaration or order on this issue, the matter should be referred to me for further review.

Article 5(4)

Baker J provided a careful and comprehensive summary of the principles to be derived from the case-law relating to Article 5(4), which merits reproduction in full

35. In applying [the provisions of Schedule A1 to the MCA 2005], and assessing whether there was any infringement of Article 5(4) in this case, I have had regard to the case law, both European and domestic. The leading European cases are X v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 188; Winterwerp v The Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387; Waite v UK [2002] ECHR 804; Shtukatarov v Russia (2008) 54 EHRR 962; Stanev v Bulgaria (2012) 55 EHRR 696, MH v UK [2013] ECHR 1008, and, most recently, Ivinovic v Croatia [2014] ECHR 964. From those authorities, the following principles can be summarised:

(1) “There is a positive obligation on the state to protect the liberty of those within its jurisdiction. Otherwise, there would be a sizeable gap in the protection from arbitrary detention, which would be inconsistent with the importance of personal liberty in a democratic society. The state is therefore obliged to take measures providing effective protection of vulnerable persons, including reasonable steps to prevent a deprivation of liberty of which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge”: Stanev v Bulgaria at paragraph 120.

(2) The procedure required by Article 5(4) must have a judicial character and be independent of the detaining authority: X v United Kingdom, supra, para 53, MH v UK, supra, para 77(c).

(3) Article 5(4) guarantees a remedy that must be accessible to the person concerned: MH v UK, supra, para 76.

(4)  The state has an obligation to ensure that a mentally incapacitated adult is afforded independent representation, enabling them to have their Convention complaints examined before a court or other independent body: Ivinovic v Croatia, supra, para 45.

(5)  Special procedural safeguards may be called for in order to protect the interests of persons who, on account of mental disabilities, are not fully capable of acting for themselves. Where a person lacks the capacity to instruct lawyers directly, the safeguards required may include empowering or even requiring some other person to act on that person’s behalf: Winterwerp v The Netherlands, supra, para 60, MH v UK, supra, paras 77(e) and 92.

(6) Article 5(4) may not be complied with where access to a court is dependent on the exercise of discretion by a third party, rather than an automatic entitlement. Where the third party supports the deprivation of liberty, reliance on the third party to initiate proceedings may not satisfy the requirements of Article 5(4): Shtukatarov v Russia, supra, para 124.

(7) An initial period of detention may be authorised by an administrative authority as an emergency measure provided it is of short duration and the individual is able to bring judicial proceedings speedily to challenge the lawfulness of any such detention including, where appropriate, its lawful justification as an emergency measure: MH v UK, supra, para 77(a).

(8)  The likelihood of the judicial hearing leading to release from detention is irrelevant. Article 5(4) is first and foremost a guarantee of a fair procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of detention – an applicant is not required, as a precondition of enjoying that protection, to show that on the facts of his case he stands any particular chance of success in obtaining his release: Waite v UK, supra, para 59.

36. In domestic law, the fundamental principle to be applied by the Court of Protection in cases of deprivation of liberty was summarised by Peter Jackson J in Neary v LB of Hillingdon [2011] EWHC 1377 (COP) at para 202:

‘… there is an obligation on the State to ensure that a person deprived of liberty is not only entitled but enabled to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed speedily by a court.”

Baker J noted the “guidance” given by the President in Re X as to the question of whether P needed to be joined as a party to proceedings for judicial authorisation for deprivation of liberty, and, in particular, paragraph 19, the conclusions of the President as to Article 5(4) as regards the requirements of “representation” if P is not to be a party to proceedings.   [This paragraph will be the subject of intense scrutiny on 17-8 February before the Court of Appeal].

Initial authorisation

Baker J found that it was clear that Mr and Mrs C were clearly saying before they went on holiday that they could not continue to care for AJ and that a move to permanent residential care was required.


47.  As it was clear that AJ would not go willingly to X House, and that such a move would only be achieved by depriving her of her liberty, the local authority, prior to that move taking place, ought to have either carried out a DOLS assessment or made an application to the Court. During the first few days of her stay at X House, there was no authorisation in place, nor was there an RPR or an IMCA appointed to support her. The fact that the first two weeks of her stay at X House were nominally labelled as “respite” care cannot justify the local authority’s failure either to instigate the DOLS process or apply to the court. The local authority plainly knew that Mr. and Mrs. C would not agree to AJ returning home at the end of their holiday and that, whatever may have been said about respite care, the move was intended to be permanent from the outset.

48. In this case, the local authority had sufficient time to commence the process of authorisation. This case therefore fell within the ‘vast majority of cases’ in which, as Chapter 3 of the Code of Practice recognises, “it should be possible to plan in advance so that a standard authorisation can be obtained before the deprivation of liberty begins”. Given the scheme of the Act is that urgent authorisations are expected to last for no more seven days save in exceptional circumstances, the local authority ought to have been able to complete the process of assessment and grant of a standard authorisation before AJ arrived at X House on 13th June. In the alternative, given the fact that AJ’s objections to being placed in residential care were clear and well-known, the local authority could have applied straight to the Court of Protection without going through the authorisation procedure under Schedule A1. As Keehan J observed in NHS Trusts 1 and 2 v FG [2014] EWCOP 30 at paragraph 101(iii), ‘the mere fact that a deprivation of liberty could be authorised under Schedule A1 does not absolve [the authority] from making an application to the court where the facts would otherwise merit it.’”

Importantly, this failure meant that there was no proper analysis of alternative options for AJ’s care, nor was she afforded any opportunity to have her views considered, before the move to X House occurred.   Baker J also found that it was irrelevant that the initial move took place, as an measure of interim support, not on the basis of s.21 National Assistance Act 1948, but rather under the statutory duties imposed by s.47(5) of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990. As he noted at paragraph 50: “[the consequence of the decision was that she, an incapacitated adult, was thereby deprived of her liberty. The local authority was therefore under an obligation to comply with Article 5 and it was unlawful under s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 for the authority to act in a way that was incompatible with AJ’s rights under that Article.”

Baker J therefore found at paragraph 51 that there had been:

 “a clear breach of the principles identified in the European and domestic case law. As the European Court made clear in Stanev v Bulgaria, supra, the state is obliged to take measures providing effective protection of vulnerable persons, including reasonable steps to prevent a deprivation of liberty of which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge. In this case, the local authority was in breach of that obligation by failing either to instigate the standard authorisation procedure under Schedule A1 or alternatively apply direct to the Court of Protection in advance of AJ’s admission to X House.


The core of the Official Solicitor’s case on behalf of AJ was that the local authority not to have appointed Mr C to act as RPR at all, or at least not without ensuring that he would bring proceedings under s.21A in the light of AJ’s known objections, or alternatively, having appointed him, replaced him when it became apparent that he was not going to facilitate a speedy review of her detention.

 After a detailed analysis of the (inordinately) complicated statutory provisions, Baker J concluded that Mr C was not eligible to be AJ’s RPR because:

1.  A person is only eligible to be an RPR if they will, as part of supporting the relevant person, take appropriate steps to support the person to challenge any authorisation granted under Schedule A1 (paragraph 82).   This construction of paragraphs 140(a) and (b) of Schedule A1 was supported, Baker J, noted by the Strasbourg case-law, in particular the case of Shtukatarov v Russia.

2. The evidence “manifestly demonstrate[d] that Mr. C was unwilling or at least very reluctant to represent or support AJ in challenging the authorisation because he and his wife had concluded that they could no longer safely look after her at home and he believed that it was in her best interests to live in residential care” (paragraph 84).  As Baker J noted, Mr C had immediately noted that he had a conflict of interest, and raised it with Ms G.  Ms G’s response had been to arrange for the appointment of an IMCA, but “the appointment of an IMCA cannot overcome the ineligibility of the RPR” (paragraph 84).

3.  Further, at paragraph 86, Baker J accepted the Official Solicitor’s submission that:

“the local authority ought not to have appointed Mr. C as RPR notwithstanding the fact that he was selected by the BIA. The European and domestic case law make it clear that there is a positive duty on public authorities under the Convention to ensure that a person deprived of liberty is not only entitled but enabled to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed speedily by a court, to ensure that a mentally incapacitated adult is afforded independent representation, enabling them to have their Convention complaints examined before a court or other independent body, and not to permit access to a court to be dependent on the exercise of discretion by a third party who supports the deprivation of liberty. As the President has made clear in of Re X and Others (Deprivation of Liberty) [2014], it is not always necessary for P to be joined as a party to any proceedings, but the state is under a clear duty to ensure that he or she is able to challenge a deprivation of liberty in a process that is judicial, accessible and independent of the detaining authority. To my mind, these obligations impose on the local authority as supervisory body a duty to scrutinise the prospective RPR selected under regulations 5 to 8 before making the appointment. I do not accept Mr. Dooley’s submission that it was not open to the local authority as supervisory body to refuse to appoint Mr. C as RPR. The fact that, under regulation 11, a supervisory body may not (except where regulation 9 applies) appoint a RPR unless the person is recommended by a BIA under regulation 7 or 8 does not mean that it is obliged to appoint a person who is so recommended. Where a supervisory body has reason to believe that the person selected as RPR will not comply with the obligations under paragraph 140 of the Schedule, its duties under Article 5 compel it to refer the matter back to the BIA.

4.  Having (wrongly) appointed Mr C as RPR, the local authority as the supervisory body ought to have quickly realised (1) that AJ was extremely unhappy in residential care and wished to challenge the authorisations and (2) that Mr C was not taking any or any sufficient steps to represent or support her in pursuing that challenge. “The local authority should therefore have taken steps to replace Mr C as RPR when it became apparent that he was not intending to issue proceedings promptly and that there was not going to be a speedy review of AJ’s detention by a court, since s.21A proceedings must be brought very promptly to ensure compliance with Article 5(4)” (paragraph 90).


Baker J was called to determine a number of questions in relation to the provisions relating to s.39D IMCAs.  In summary form, he concluded that:

1.  The functions of a section 39D IMCA are as set out in that section, as supplemented by Schedule A1, and concern matters relating to the deprivation of liberty provisions under the Schedule. An IMCA appointed under section 39D does not have a broader, general role of representing or supporting P, and is not under a general duty to assist in determining what is in P’s best interests but, rather, to perform the specific functions set out in section 39D(7), (8) and (9) [i.e. in very broad terms, supporting the RPR and the relevant person to understand matters relating to the authorisation and helping them exercise their rights to apply to court or for a Part 8 review] (see paragraph 108);

2. Where P has executed a LPA, the duty to appoint an IMCA under section 39D is not excluded under section 40(1)(b) unless the donee of the LPA is authorised to make decisions in relation to the matters in section 39D(7) and (8) (paragraph 112);

3. Standard health and welfare LPAs do not grant authority to the donee to make decisions relating to matters to which the duty to appoint an IMCA under section 39D(2) relates (paragraphs 115-6);

4. The fact of the grant of a standard health and welfare LPA will not therefore relieve a local authority of its duty to appoint a s.39D IMCA if any of the three cases in 39D(3),(4) or (5) arise [i.e. the relevant person or their RPR request one or the local authority consider the appointment of one is – in essence – necessary to ensure the person’s rights are secured] (paragraph 116).

On the facts of the case, therefore, he concluded that, in fact, a s.39D IMCA had to be appointed.

Very importantly, Baker J found that the fact of the appointment of the s.39D IMCA did not absolve the local authority of further responsibility:

“125. The principal errors committed by the local authority in this case were, as analysed above, the failure to initiate the authorization process prior to the 13th June 2013 and wrongly appointing Mr. C to act as RPR. In my judgment, however, the local authority’s obligations did not stop there. The local authority thought that it would be meeting its obligations by appointing an IMCA and making resources available to assist the IMCA to act as litigation friend. As set out above, the appointment of an IMCA under section 39D was entirely appropriate and, although Mr. C was uncertain about how to take matters forward, I accept the local authority’s case that resources were in fact available, for example to assist an IMCA acting as litigation friend. In most cases, that would in all probability have been sufficient. In this case, however, the local authority knew that Mr. C was unwilling or at least very reluctant to represent or support AJ in challenging the authorisation because he and his wife had concluded that they could no longer safely look after her at home and he believed that it was in her best interests to live in residential care. In those circumstances, I find that the appointment of Mr. R and the provision of resources to assist him in his role as IMCA did not absolve the local authority from its continuing obligation to ensure that AJ’s rights under Article 5(4) were respected. The local authority knew at all times that AJ did not wish to be in X House or Y House. In those circumstances, I consider that the local authority, in addition to monitoring the actions of Mr. C as RPR and taking steps to replace him if appropriate, should have made enquiries as to why the IMCA was not taking steps to ensure that the right to apply to the court was being exercised.”(emphasis added)

Baker J emphasised that – as a last resort – the local authority should have considered bringing proceedings before the court itself.   This was “[p]lainly this is a last resort, because of the comprehensive and complex provisions for the selection and appointment of RPRs and the appointment of IMCAs are followed, and if RPRs and IMCAs appointed under these provisions carry out their responsibilities as they should, the rights of an incapacitated person to challenge a deprivation of liberty normally will be protected” (paragraph 126).

However, the local authority “remained under a continuing and positive obligation to “ensure that AJ’s Article 5(4) rights were respected. Thus, if it was not satisfied that the IMCA was taking the necessary steps to apply to the court, and if in all the circumstances it considered such a course to be appropriate, it should have brought court proceedings itself.” (paragraph 126, emphasis added).


Baker J found that the case told a sorry tale of a series of failures by a number of people to ensure that the procedures designed to ensure that AJ’s rights under Article 5 were respected, for which ultimate responsibility lay with the local authority.   He therefore granted the declarations sought by the Official Solicitor.

Wider practice

As set out above, Baker J then pulled the threads together to give wider guidance for practitioners.


Whilst much of the judgment concerned extremely technical interpretation of the provisions of the MCA and the relevant secondary legislation (much of which strongly suggests that the whole regime is beyond repair as a statutory mechanism), it is, at heart, a vitally important assertion of the importance of public bodies taking appropriate steps:

  • To recognise when apparently beneficent steps will lead to a deprivation of liberty;
  • To be honest about what exactly those steps will be;
  • To pause before taking those steps to check whether, in fact, they are necessary or whether a less restrictive option can be pursued;
  • If they are necessary, to ensure – wherever possible – that the necessary authority is in place before they are taken;
  • To recognise the continuing and positive obligation imposed upon local authorities to ensure that those subject to standard authorisations are afforded an effective right to challenge their detention before the Court of Protection.

The case is also a clear recognition of the ‘hard-edged’ nature of rights under Articles 5(1) and 5(4).   It is clear that Mr C thought that he was acting in AJ’s best interests, and that, as a family member, he had a more complete and rounded picture of the circumstances than an RPR who had only met AJ on a limited number of occasions.   However, through a truly Lemony Snicket series of events, her family members and the local authority ended up inadvertently conspiring to preclude her raising her fundamental objections to being “dumped” (as her friends perceived it) in a care home.

The final point relates to the preliminary point determined by Baker J in relation to the need for honesty in care plans as to exactly what level of restraint is being imposed upon an individual.  This point is equally, if not more, important in relation to those in respect of whom Re X applications are being made –where, as matters currently stand, the court will only have the applicant’s word for what is going on…

[footnote – for further excellent comment on the case which arrived as I was writing this, see Lucy Series’ post here]

Richard Gordon QC, ‘Thoughts on P v Cheshire West and P and Q’

Richard Gordon QC, Brick Court Chambers, delivered the closing address at the LAG 2014 community care conference which took place on the 5 December in London.

He has kindly agreed to let us post the speech on our blog.

Richard was leading counsel for the three successful appellants in the Supreme Court in P v Cheshire West; P and Q v Surrey County Council.

Download a copy of the address here.  This  is reproduced from the December issue of Community Care Law Reports.