Somewhat surprisingly, the question of the responsibility of NHS bodies/local authorities to provide s.49 MCA reports at no cost to the parties has not been the subject of a reported judgment until now (although I am aware of both unreported judgments and observations expressed by judges in the course of hearings). In RS v LCC & Ors  EWCOP 56, District Judge Bellamy has now stepped into the breach, although, as he noted, the difficult questions arising the provision of s.49 reports and their consequences for public bodies may ultimately have to be considered elsewhere.
The detailed facts of the case are not relevant. Suffice it to say to say that, during the course of a s.21A application, the court required a s.49 report to be provided by the mental health Trust responsible for P, addressing her capacity “as the gateway to the jurisdiction of the court.” The relevant NHS Trust declined to provide the report, both on the basis that it was impossible to provide it, and – more fundamentally – that it was inappropriate for the evidence sought to be provided by way of an order under s.49. The Trust’s objections were both specific to the nature of the evidence sought and more generally directed to the application of s.49 in respect of individuals for whom they already had a clinical responsibility. The Trust advanced 10 reasons to support their view that it was inappropriate for the required evidence to be obtained by way of Section 49. As District Judge Bellamy then addressed each of these reasons in turn, it is convenient to set out each of the objections together with his conclusions on each point in turn:
(1) The Trust has no clinical involvement or knowledge of P (other than the information contained in the applicant’s enclosed letter). P is not a patient under the Mental Health Services of the Trust.
Conclusion: While I note the argument there is no such distinction [i.e. between patients and non-patients] drawn within the powers given in Section 49 and the accompanying Rules or Practice Direction. In my view it would be wrong for the court to undertake such distinction either in the preparation of its orders generally or in this order in particular.
There appears to be a clear dispute on capacity the outcome of which may have a significant impact on P’s future care and welfare. Such a dispute should properly be resolved by way of a jointly instructed independent court expert. It is not appropriate to seek quasi expert evidence through Section 49.
Conclusion: The dispute as to capacity has arisen following a report from a consultant psychiatrist dealing with matters pertaining to a lasting power of attorney. There is an existing assessment by a consultant psychiatrist Dr Loosmore and a very experienced social worker. A question has therefore arisen in relation to RS as to the extent or otherwise of her capacity. It is a matter well suited for determination by Section 49 which is a proportionate response as opposed to an instruction to an independent expert. Such direction would have additional funding and cost consequences particularly in the instant case where three of the parties are either publicly funded or public bodies and the fourth is privately paying albeit acting in person. Furthermore a Section 49 Report would [or should at any rate] incur significantly less delay.
(3) A Section 49 Report is not a joint instruction and therefore can potentially leave open a dispute in the event that the evidence is not accepted by all parties. We understand that the first Respondent was not in agreement that Section 49 is appropriate.
Conclusion: A Section 49 Report is a direction of the court. If a letter of instruction cannot be agreed the court will deal with any such dispute. It was the court’s direction and not that of any specific party.
The Trust’s consultants are not court experts: they do not have the expertise in preparation of Medico Legal reports and should not be expected to do so, particularly where it is not in connection with a patient under their care.
Conclusion: The Rules and in particular the Practice Direction are clear as to the contents and format of a report. If that format is followed specific medico legal experience is not required. However, given the significant growth in the volume of work undertaken by the Court of Protection and in particular Section 21A or related challenges, it is no doubt a level of expertise that all consultant psychiatrists particularly dealing with the elderly will acquire if they have not already done so.
(5) We understand a report in the proceedings has been prepared on a private instruction by Dr Gonzalez (of the Trust). There is a potential conflict of interests in seeking a further report from a consultant of the Trust.
Conclusion: The court can see no potential conflict of interest in another consultant of the Trust preparing a report. Again the duty of the author of the report is fully set out in the Rules and Practice Direction.
(6) The request was a publicly funded body into proceedings of which it has no involvement.
Conclusion: The provisions of Section 49 are clear. There is a wide range in power to direct a report from an NHS body as the court considers appropriate. It is common for Section 49 Reports to be directed in this way.
(7) Complying with the request places a significant and disproportionate burden on limited NHS resources.
Conclusion: The court has sympathy with the effect of its order upon the Trust. However as is noted earlier no provision is made within Section 49 in relation to fees or expenses incurred by the author of the report (be it NHS body, Trust or otherwise). What the court will do is to carefully consider resources and listen to any argument from the Trust particularly in relation to the time for compliance and the scope of the work to be undertaken. That would appear to be both a reasonable and proportionate approach.
A consultant would need to cancel clinics to make time to prepare the report; putting vulnerable patients at risk.
Conclusion: While this is noted the answer to 7 would seem to cover this.
(9) There is no provision for costs of the report in order to enable the Trust to employ locum cover for the report author. The Trust is already under significant pressure to reduce its locum cover:
Conclusion: I have already dealt with this in 7 above.
(10) Even where locum cover can be sourced this can be detrimental to patients if they are not able to see their usual consultant with whom they have built a trusting professional relationship. Consistency of care is an important factor in mental health care and should be maintained wherever possible.
Conclusion: As stated above every effort will be made to accommodate the preparation and extent of the report so as to limit wherever possible the disruption in healthcare provided by a consultant to his patients.
District Judge Bellamy therefore declined to vary or alter the principle behind the original order directing the s.49 report, although he noted that: “it must be right that compliance with any order is subject to reasonable adjustment on application by the Trust in relation to the scope and extent of any report ordered and the time for compliance. However such applications must be made promptly and supported by evidence on behalf of the Trust or NHS body.”
On the very specific facts of this case, an immediate question comes to my mind as to why District Judge Bellamy did not seek a report (under s.49) from a Special Visitor. If the issue to be addressed was that of P’s capacity, and the court felt that it needed independent expertise in order, the obvious route to obtain that evidence is undoubtedly that provided for by the Special Visitor route. There may well have been reasons not apparent on the face of the judgment why such a course was not open to him, and, if so, then the course adopted would appear to have been both proportionate and reasonable. The conclusion that a public body cannot seek to recoup the costs of preparation of such a report is also undoubtedly correct.
The case, though, does raise a wider point about the importance of s.49 reports that may be at risk of being lost in the (understandable) concerns expressed by public bodies as to the time and resources that may be required where they are directed to provide such reports. The Court of Protection is a strange beast. It is regularly said to be inquisitorial in its jurisdiction: see, e.g. Re G  EWCOP 1361 at paragraph 26. However, by comparison with the Family Division/Family Court, which is also said to discharge an inquisitorial jurisdiction, the Court is strangely underpowered – there is, in particular, no equivalent to a children’s guardian (whether a consequence is that the role of litigation friend in the COP is being distorted is something I am working on at present). If COP judges are to be put in a position where they are able properly to assess the questions of P’s capacity and best interests, it is crucial that they are, themselves, able to identify and call for such evidence as they see fit. Section 49 is therefore vital, both as regards the ability to call for reports from (Special) Visitors and for evidence from NHS bodies/local authorities. There is undoubtedly a price to be paid in consequence by such bodies, but, societally, it is a small one to pay for the proper determination of such cases.