The Court of Protection will accept applications by e-mail to the relevant “hub” closest to P as from the end of July 2018. You can read the letter from the Directorate, explaining exactly how this will work, here.
The Supreme Court has granted permission to the Official Solicitor to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re D  EWCA Civ 1695. The hearing has been expedited and listed for 3 and 4 October. Anyone who wants to understand how the MCA 2005 is intended to interact with the Children Act 1989 will be well advised to keep a careful eye out for the judgment in due course.
The Supreme Court will hear the appeal in MM (concerning conditional discharge and confinement) on 26 July. It has also very recently been confirmed will hear the appeal in PJ (concerning the jurisdiction of the Mental Health Tribunal over human rights issues, as well as CTOs and deprivation of liberty) on 22 October.
The Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill has just been introduced to the House of Commons.
The press release explains that
“The reforms seek to:
- introduce a simpler process that involves families more and gives swifter access to assessments
- be less burdensome on people, carers, families and local authorities
- allow the NHS, rather than local authorities, to make decisions about their patients, allowing a more efficient and clearly accountable process
- consider restrictions of people’s liberties as part of their overall care package
- get rid of repeat assessments and authorisations when someone moves between a care home, hospital and ambulance as part of their treatment
The reforms will also save local authorities an estimated £200 million or more a year.”
The progress of the Bill will be watched by many.
We have been asked to publicise an important change to the way in which health and welfare applications and section 21A applications are issued.
As the regionalisation project moves ahead, these applications will be issued from regional centres, starting with the South West (Bristol) Regional Hub, as from 30 April 2018.
The other regional centres will begin issuing their own applications from 25 June 2018.
This does not apply to serious medical treatment cases or to property and affairs cases.
Practitioners may have received a letter from HMCTS with essential information about how the new process will work, including how issue fees should be paid. You can read the letter here.
HMCTS explain that they will try to attend user group meetings in the regional hubs before the pilot starts in that reason.
We are very pleased to confirm that on 2 April 2018 HMCTS introduced the process of appointing accredited legal representatives (ALRs) of the court’s own motion, in appropriate cases. This means that the “menu” of options for representing P, as set out in COPR r1.2 is now complete.
We hope that the court will take advantage of the cadre of ALRs who have gone through what appears to be the testing process of securing appointment to the Law Society’s Mental Capacity Accreditation Scheme.
We’re aware that some practitioners have expressed concern that, in circumstances where P has been referred by his or her RPR to a solicitor who has secured legal aid, the court may then appoint a different solicitor as ALR. There are understandable anxieties about lack of continuity for P and duplication of work.
We suggest that there is a pragmatic solution. A solicitor who has been working with P, perhaps after a referral by an RPR, and who then issues a section 21A challenge could file a statement alongside Form DLA which sets out the solicitor’s involvement with P so that the court is aware of the issue of continuity when deciding which of the rule 1.2 options to select. An accredited solicitor who wishes to be appointed as such could also file a COP9 requesting appointment.
We are very interested to hear about the experience of practitioners as the new scheme gathers pace.
In a short judgment Mr Justice Baker declined to award the Official Solicitor his costs after a CCG withdrew applications in relation to a series of test cases. You can read the judgment here.
The case concerned applications in relation to the living arrangements of incapacitated adults for whom the CCG had responsibility. All were living in their own home and the CCG sought clarification as to whether such individuals satisfied the “acid test”. The CCG also questioned whether the responsibility for any deprivation of liberty was imputable to the state solely by virtue of the fact that it provided NHS care for P. If either the acid test was not satisfied or the arrangements were not imputable to the state, of course, the adults concerned would not be deprived of their liberty for the purpose of Article 5 and thus the CCG would not be required to make an application to court for a welfare order under section 16 MCA 2005.
The Official Solicitor was invited to act for the four adults originally involved in the test case. Two were not eligible for legal aid and it was not considered reasonable to utilise P’s funds for this purpose. Subsequently one of these cases could proceed and the CCG applied to withdraw its application because the practical impact would be very limited; the CCG had reviewed its position in light of the OS’ analysis and the CCG considered that both the relevance and the strength of the application had been limited by the Law Commission’s proposed reforms. The Official Solicitor sought his costs, submitting that in reality the application was akin to a civil claim where he had succeeded.
Baker J refused the application. He gave no weight to the argument that the costs would be borne by the public purse in the form of the Legal Aid Agency stating that a legally aided party should be treated in exactly the same way as one without a legal aid certificate. He rejected the application for costs in these terms:
(1) I do not accept the suggestion that this was not a typical welfare case. The application concerned a series of welfare cases in which an important preliminary issue arose on a point of law.(2) As is widely recognised, the law concerning deprivation of liberty under the Mental Capacity Act is in a state of some uncertainty. That is why it has been the subject of a review by the Law Commission whose final report contains recommendations for substantial reform. The government has now accepted the report and the majority of its recommendations, and acknowledged that the current Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards should be replaced “as a matter of pressing urgency” (see government response 14 March 2018).
(3) It was in my judgment understandable that the applicant sought guidance on the issue of the impact of the “acid test” on cases involving incapacitated adults living at home, given the large number of individuals in those circumstances for whom it is responsible. In the words of rule 159(2)(b), it was reasonable for the applicant to raise and pursue this issue.
(4) Given the constraints under which all public bodies operate, the applicant was entirely justified in keeping under review the question of whether to pursue the case. Indeed, it would have been remiss if it had not done so. The fact that the applicant decided to abort the proceedings was a reasonable decision. To use the words in rule 159(2)(b) again, it was reasonable for the applicant to decide not to contest the issue in the light of developments in the litigation as described above.
(5) Although it is arguable that the difficulties in the individual cases could have been anticipated, I do not think that the applicant’s failure to do so at an earlier stage could be described as litigation conduct of the sort to justify departing from the general rule.
(6) Although my comments in G v E (Costs) above were made in a different context, they do have some relevance here. Professionals working in this field often face difficult judgements and decisions. The applicant made the decision to ask the court to consider the preliminary issue which, as Mr Ruck Keene fairly conceded, involved propositions of general and considerable importance. Subsequently, however, in the light of developments within the cases, the applicant decided not to pursue the issue. In all the circumstances, I do not consider that its decision-making and overall conduct justifies a departure from the general rule as to costs.
Comment: This is a useful application of the principles concerning costs to an unusual situation namely where an important preliminary issue arises in a “typical welfare case”. Key to this was the judge’s assessment that it was reasonable for the CCG to seek guidance about the applicability of Article 5 given the significant financial impact in a time of financial constraints had the CCG been successful; but that it was also reasonable to keep the need for the proceedings under review and to seek to withdraw them when the issue, although fascinating, had become academic.
The CoP forms have moved today (21 March) to the .Gov.uk website, and can be found here.