Month: August 2014

Court-sanctioned interventions during childbirth – guidance

Mr Justice Keehan has just handed down a very important judgment (NHS Trust & Ors v FG [2014] EWCOP 30) in which he gives guidance as to when and how applications should made where a treating Trust is concerned that pregnant woman lacks, or may lack, the capacity to take decisions about her antenatal, perinatal and post natal care as a result of an impairment of, or a disturbance in, the functioning of her mind or brain resulting from a diagnosed psychiatric illness.

A post here addresses the details of the judgment (which also includes confirmation that the acid test set down in Cheshire West applies in the hospital setting).    Reproduced here, however, is the Guidance in full (which appears as an annex to the judgment).   As Keehan J noted at the conclusion of his judgment:

“129. The Guidance is not intended to restrict the cases where Trusts make an application to the Court to only those cases which fall within categories 1 – 4. It identifies those categories of cases which should be the subject of an application. It must always remain open to Trusts to make an application to the Court in cases of this nature if the individual circumstances of the case justify it.

130. I hope that early and thorough planning in cases of this nature will result in the proper identification of cases which require an application to the Court and, on the contrary, those which can properly and appropriately be managed under the provisions of MCA 2005 and/or MHA 1983 without judicial involvement.”

 Guidance

Introduction:

  1. In this guidance the following terminology will be used:

 

‘P’                                           the pregnant woman who lacks, or may lack, the capacity to take decisions in relation to her antenatal, perinatal and postnatal care as a result of an impairment of, or a disturbance in, the functioning of her mind or brain resulting from her psychiatric illness;

‘obstetric care’                    all care and treatment needs brought about by P’s pregnancy including antenatal care, management of labour and delivery, and postnatal care;

‘Mental Health Trust’       the NHS Trust responsible for P’s psychiatric care, whether in the community or in a psychiatric hospital;

‘psychiatric hospital’         any mental health unit at which P resides, whether detained pursuant to statutory powers or as a voluntary patient;

‘acute hospital’                   a hospital other than the psychiatric hospital at which it is intended that P will receive obstetric care and deliver her child;

‘Acute Trust’                         the NHS Trust responsible for the acute hospital;

‘Court’                                    either the Court of Protection or the Family Division of the High Court.

2. This Guidance applies in cases where a pregnant woman who lacks, or may lack, the capacity to make decisions about her obstetric care (see paragraph 1 above) resulting from a diagnosed psychiatric illness, falls within one of the four categories of cases set out in paragraph 3 below.

3. An Acute Trust and/or Mental Health trust should make an application to seek orders in relation to P’s obstetric care to the Court of Protection or to the Family Division of the High Court if the case falls within any of the following four categories, namely where:

Category 1 – the interventions proposed by the Trust(s) probably amount to serious medical treatment within the meaning of COP Practice Direction 9E, irrespective of whether it is contemplated that the obstetric treatment would otherwise be provided under the MCA or MHA; or

 

Category 2 – there is a real risk that P will be subject to more than transient forcible restraint; or

 

Category 3 –  there is a serious dispute as to what obstetric care is in P’s best interests whether as between the clinicians caring for P, or between the clinicians and P and/or those whose views must be taken into account under s.4(7) of the MCA; or

 

Category 4 – there is a real risk that P will suffer a deprivation of her liberty which, absent a Court order which has the effect of authorising it, would otherwise be unlawful (i.e. not authorised under s4B of or Schedule A1 to the MCA).

4. In relation to category 1, it is recommended that the following categories of case should be the subject of an application to the court, namely :

    (i) delivery by caesarean section is proposed in circumstances where the merits of that proposal are finely balanced; or
    (ii) delivery by caesarean section is proposed and is likely to involve more than transient forcible restraint of P.

5. It may be appropriate to make an application to the court in cases which do not fall within the categories set out in paragraph 3 above; it will depend on the facts of the case. If an application is so made, the provisions of this Guidance should be followed.

 

Assessment:

 6. The early identification of an individual in respect of whom an application might have to be made is essential. In the case where P is detained under the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983, the lead professional is likely to be a treating psychiatrist at the hospital where P is detained. In the case where P is living in the community the lead professional is likely to be a member of P’s midwifery team.

7.  Once P has been so identified, the Acute and Mental Health Trusts should liaise to assess P’s capacity to make decisions in respect of her obstetric care and to plan how and when such care is to be delivered in her best interests.

8. An assessment of P’s capacity to litigate should be undertaken; this will usually be performed by P’s treating psychiatrist.

9. Capacity may, of course, fluctuate and it is extremely important to keep the issue of capacity under regular review.

10. Where there are concerns about P’s ability to care for her unborn child the Acute and/or Mental Health Trusts should notify the relevant social services department of P’s case if social workers are not already involved with her. The local authority should commence child protection procedures immediately upon receipt of a referral. Thereafter, there should be regular liaison and co-operation between the Acute Trust, the Mental Health Trust and the local authority.

11. The Acute and Mental Health Trusts, together with the relevant local authority, should hold regular planning and review meetings (‘professionals meetings’). Those meetings should be minuted. Multi-agency co-operation is likely to be an essential feature of the planning process to achieve the best outcome for P and her unborn child.

12. An identified clinician from the Acute Trust or the Mental Health Trust should be appointed to chair the planning and review meetings.

13. Part of the planning process should involve identifying whether and, if so, when a decision by the Court will be required to authorise obstetric care or any deprivation of liberty to facilitate its provision.

14. The planning process should include consideration of an assessment of the risk of harm, if any, which P poses to herself, to her unborn child or to others. Where any professional considers such a risk exists that assessment must be recorded in writing and presented at the next professionals meeting.

15. If as a result of the risk assessment the local authority proposes to make an application under the inherent jurisdiction for permission to withhold the care plan for the unborn child from P, the application should be made, save in the case of a genuine emergency, no later than 4 weeks before the expected date of delivery. (The threshold for the granting of such an application is high and applications will not be granted routinely).

16. If an application is made by either the Trusts or by the local authority for permission not to notify P of the application(s) and it is thought appropriate to apply for a Reporting Restrictions Order, the applicant(s) must give full and proper notice to the print and broadcast media of the same.

17. A decision by one agency to withhold information from any other agency must be recorded identifying the cogent reasons for the decision. The agency, from whom information is to be withheld, must be notified of the same at the earliest opportunity.

 

Application:

 18. Where it is decided that P’s case falls within one of the four categories set out in paragraph 3 above or it is otherwise decided to make an application, an application should be made to the court at the earliest opportunity.

19. Save in a case of genuine medical emergency, any application should be made no later than 4 weeks before the expected date of delivery. This time frame is required for the following reasons:

 

(i) where P is assessed as lacking capacity to litigate, it will enable the Official Solicitor to undertake any necessary investigations;

(ii) to ensure the final hearing is listed and heard at least a few days before the proposed interventions; and

(iii) to enable a directions hearing to be held around 2 weeks before the final hearing. The court and the parties will then have the opportunity to ensure the court has all the relevant and necessary evidence at the final hearing.

20. In compliance with the timetable set out above, the Trusts should in a timely manner, take the following steps:

 

 

 

(i) issue the application

(ii) notify the Official Solicitor of the application;

(iii) disclose any evidence to the Official Solicitor which they consider appropriate;

(iv) seek an urgent directions hearing, preferably around two weeks before the final hearing, at which disclosure and the scope of the evidence can be determined;

(v) liaise with the Clerk of the Rules to list the substantive hearing at an early stage.

21. It is important that the Trusts should seek early advice and input from their legal advisers.

 

 

22. Late applications are to be avoided save in a case of genuine medical emergency. They have four very undesirable consequences:

(i) the application is more likely to be dealt with by the out of hours judge and without a full hearing in public;

(ii) the available written evidence is more likely to be incomplete and necessitate substantial oral evidence;

(iii) it seriously undermines the role that the Official Solicitor can and should properly play in the proceedings; and

(iv) it deprives the court of the opportunity to direct that further evidence, including independent expert evidence, if necessary, is obtained in relation to the issue of capacity or best interests.

 

This approach is dictated by P’s Article 5, 6 and 8 rights and best interests.

23. The following evidence should be filed and served in every application:

(a) In the event that P is to be transferred from a psychiatric hospital to an acute hospital for her obstetric care, a care plan from the Mental Health Trust for that transfer, to include

(i) when and, if not at a defined time, the circumstances in which P is to be transferred;

(ii) the form of transport (ambulance, secure taxi etc.)

(iii) which members of staff are to accompany P;

(iv) an assessment of the prospects of P not co-operating with the transfer;

(v) whether any specialist advice has been obtained in relation to the restraint of pregnant women and, if it has, the nature of that advice;

(vi) the plans for any restraint that may be used to facilitate the transfer, including who is to undertake the restraint, at whose direction, and with a description of the techniques to be used;

(vii) a clear description of what P’s status will be under the MHA during transfer and whilst at the acute hospital.

(b) A care plan from the Acute Trust for P’s obstetric care, including:

(i) the obstetric interventions and care that are proposed;

(ii) what anaesthesia is planned, or may be required

(iii) when, where and by whom the interventions, care and anaesthesia are to be delivered;

(iv) what further interventions may become necessary and in what circumstances.

(c) A care plan from the Acute Trust relating to the issue of restraint at the acute hospital, including:

(i) an assessment of the prospects of P not complying with the obstetric interventions and care that is proposed;

(ii) in a stepwise and escalating fashion, a description of the measures and techniques to be used;

(iii) who is to undertake the physical or chemical restraint;

(iv) whether any specialist advice in relation to the restraint of pregnant women has been obtained and, if so, the nature of that advice.

(d) A witness statement from P’s responsible clinician (or to the extent that he/she cannot deal with the issues, from others) which:

(i) contains an overview of P’s psychiatric history;

(ii) details the liaison between the psychiatric and obstetric teams caring for P

(iii) includes a focused assessment of P’s capacity to consent to the obstetric treatment which is proposed

(iv) sets out the duration for which P’s lack of capacity is likely to persist despite any steps that can reasonably be taken to help her regain capacity

(v) contains an assessment of the prospects of P not co-operating with the obstetric care that is proposed and its alternatives;

(vi) endorses the plan for transfer and any restraint during it;

(vii) compares the impact upon her mental health of the proposed obstetric treatment and restraint and any alternatives;

(viii) assesses what obstetric treatment is in P’s best interests from a psychiatric perspective.

(e) A witness statement from a consultant obstetrician (or to the extent that he/she cannot deal with the issues, from others) which:

(i) contains an overview of P’s obstetric history so far as it is known;

(ii) reviews the obstetric care already provided in the present pregnancy;

(iii) details the liaison between the obstetric and psychiatric teams caring for P;

(iv) explains what obstetric treatment and interventions are proposed;

(v) identifies what alternative management strategies exist

(vi) deals with the anaesthesia which may be used and its risks/benefits

(vii) refers to the obstetric care plan;

(viii) contains an assessment of the prospects of P not co-operating with the obstetric care that is proposed and its alternatives;

(ix) endorses the care plan for restraint at the acute hospital;

(x) compares the risks and benefits to P of the proposed obstetric treatment and interventions versus the alternatives and justification as to why the plan proposed is in P’s best interests;

(xi) explains why the proposed obstetric treatment and interventions are in P’s best interests.

(f) Witness evidence, which may be contained in the witness statements from the consultant psychiatrist and obstetrician, which:

(i) sets out, insofar as they are able, P’s past and present wishes and feelings and beliefs and values in relation to

(1) the pregnancy;

(2) obstetric care, including the proposed obstetric care and interventions;

(3) the importance of minimising the risk to her own health during pregnancy and delivery of her baby;

(4) the importance of maximising the prospects of safe delivery of the baby;

(ii) explains whether P knows of the application and, if not sets out the cogent reasons why P has not and should not be informed of the application;

(iii) identifies the individuals whose views should be taken into account in accordance with s.4(7) of the MCA and sets out the gist of their views as to

(1) whether the obstetric care that is proposed is in P’s best interests and, if not, what care they consider would be;

(2) P’s own past and present wishes and feelings and beliefs and values in relation to the matters in (i) above.

24. Any orders authorising medical intervention, restraint and/or a deprivation of liberty are, of course, permissive and not mandatory. P’s capacity to make decisions and/or the need to take any of the measures authorised by the court must be kept under close review by her treating clinicians and medical professions throughout P’s antenatal, perinatal and postnatal care.

 

 

 

 

 

Documents Checklist.

 

1. Application notice

2. Transfer Care Plan (where relevant)

3. Obstetric care plan

4. Restraint care plan

5. Witness statement from the responsible consultant psychiatrist

6. Witness statement from the responsible consultant obstetrician

 

 

Post-Cheshire West Judgment Released

The President today released a preliminary judgment in Re X and others (Deprivation of Liberty) [2014] EWCOP 25 setting out briefly his answers to those of the 25 questions he posed at an earlier hearing and which require an early decision. It concentrates on the issues directly relevant to what he calls the ‘streamlined’ process. It sets out no more than the broad framework of what the President considers is required to ensure that the ‘streamlined’ process is Article 5 compliant. Additional, detailed, work needs to be carried out as soon as possible by the Court of Protection in conjunction, where appropriate, with the Rules Committee.

A further judgment will follow in due course, elaborating on his reasons for deciding as he has and dealing with the questions – in particular questions (6), (8) and (10) – not dealt with in this judgment.

The judgment sets out a pretty detailed list of what information the new application forms should direct that applicants provide including that professional medical opinion will be necessary – a GP report may suffice, but he has not gone as far as saying that e.g. a social worker can confirm a long-standing diagnosis.

On the questions of greatest concern to practitioners:

The President held that P does not need to be a party, but he has made very clear that P must be able to present their case properly and satisfactorily and participate – and he has delegated how that should happen to the Rules Committee .

 

  1. What the Convention requires is that P be able to participate in the proceedings in such a way as to enable P to present their case “properly and satisfactorily”: see Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305, para 24. More specifically, “it is essential that the person concerned should have access to a court and the opportunity to be heard either in person or, where necessary, through some form of representation, failing which he will not have been afforded ‘the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty’.”: Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387, para 60. P should always be given the opportunity to be joined if they wish and whether joined as a party or not must be given the support necessary to express views about the application and to participate in the proceedings to the extent that they wish. So long as that demanding standard is met, and in my judgment it can in principle be met without P being joined as a party, there is no need for P to be a party.
  2. If P is a party to the proceedings, P must have a litigation friend. If P is participating other than as a party, there is no need for a litigation friend.
  3. These are all matters which require urgent consideration by the Committee as part of its more general review of Rule 73(4)

A LF does not need to act through a solicitor to conduct litigation, but requires the permission of the court to act as an advocate on behalf of P: in both of these conclusions he has (at this stage) followed Gregory v Turner.

All applications must be made to a judge and certain factors may trigger the need for an oral hearing although this is not needed in all cases.  These include:

  • Any contest, whether by P or by anyone else, to any of the matters referred to in paragraphs 35(ii)-(vii) below.
  • Any failure to comply with any of the requirements set out in paragraph 35(viii) below
  • Any concerns arising out of information supplied in accordance with paragraphs 35(ix), (xiii) and (xiv) below
  • Any objection by P.
  • Any potential conflict with any decision of the kind referred to in paragraph 35(x) below.
  • If for any other reason the court thinks that an oral hearing is necessary or appropriate.”

“Bulk” applications are not lawful.  (para 38-9).

Reviews should be annually unless otherwise required; must be judicial and may take place on the papers, whether or not there has been an earlier oral hearing, raising the possibility of a process where there is no hearing at all and where P would not have the benefit of legal aid which requires an oral hearing.

Update: together with Neil Allen and Tor Butler-Cole, Alex has produced this document which provides a practical guide to such applications (and seeks to answer some of the questions arising from the judgment).

Courts Service may have to meet costs of legal representation where no other funding is available

 

The President has just handed down a judgment in a family case, Q v Q  [2014] EWFC 31 which has implications for Court of Protection practitioners as well as for those working in the family courts.

The judgment related to three unrelated cases: Q V Q, where the President had previously handed down a judgment Q  v Q [2014] EWFC 7 ; Re B, which had been heard by HHJ Wildblood (D v K [2014] EWHC 700 (Fam))and a third case, Re C.

All were private law proceedings where the father of child who lived with the mother sought a role in the child’s life. In all three the mother had legal aid and the father did not.

The cases raised problems which pre-dated but were exacerbated by LASPO.  The President summarised the provisions of LASPO and exceptional funding regime; noting that the threshold for exceptional funding had been found too high in Gudanaviciene and others v Director of Legal Aid Casework [2014] EWHC 1840 (Admin)and commented that the very small number of successful applications for exceptional funding suggested that the system was “inadequate” [at para 14].

Q v Q was an application for contact by a father who was a convicted sex offender, where the President had invited the Secretary of State for Justice to intervene and make submissions as to how expenditure for certain activities could be met if the court considered it to be necessary but it was not available from legal aid and in particular if it could be met from the other party’s certificate or from the court [para 23].   The Secretary of State declined to intervene; the father had asked the Public Law Project for assistance with exceptional funding application.  The proceedings had stalled because the father required an interpreter and possibly a translation of documents; there was no funding to bring the experts in the case to court; and the father had to appear as a litigant in person.

In Re B a father applied for contact with his child.  The  mother asserted the father had raped her, necessitating a fact-finding hearing.  As in the other cases the mother had legal aid and the father did not, giving rise to the spectre of the alleged perpetatrator cross examining an alleged victim in person. This would have been prohibited had this been a criminal case: s34 YJCEA 1999 .

Section 31G(6) Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 was amended by Schedule 10 Crime and Courts Act 2013  and provides

“Where in any proceedings in the family court it appears to the court that any party to the proceedings who is not legally represented is unable to examine or cross-examine a witness effectively, the court is to – 
(a) ascertain from that party the matters about which the witness may be able to depose or on which the witness ought to be cross-examined, and
(b) put, or cause to be put, to the witness such questions in the interests of that party as may appear to the court to be proper.”

HHJ Wildblood found this criteria to be met in January 2014 . Following this the father eventually succeeded in obtaining legal aid after commencing judicial review proceeding sand following the judgment in Gudanaviciene.

Re C again concerned an application for contact by a father where the mother asserted that he had raped her. The father was awaiting trial at the Crown Court.

The President noted at para 43 that:

“The absence of public funding for those too impoverished to pay for their own representation potentially creates at least three major problems: first, the denial of legal advice and of assistance in drafting documents; second, and most obvious, the denial of professional advocacy in the court room; third, the denial of the ability to bring to court a professional witness whose fees for attending are beyond the ability of the litigant to pay. Each of these problems is, of course, exacerbated if the litigant needs a translator to translate documents and an interpreter to interpret what is going on in court.”

By way of setting the scene he referred to the over-riding objective of dealing with cases justly, set out in FPR 1.1  (and at COPR3.1) as well as the requirements of the courts to act consistently with Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention and the requirement that A6 rights should be effective.   Mantovanelli v France (Application no 21497/93  (1997) 24 EHRR 370) indicated indicates the significance of the right to an adversarial hearing guaranteed by Article 6 specifically in the context of an expert’s report which is “likely to have a preponderant influence on the assessment of the facts by [the] court.” (at para 49).

In connection with the need for an interpreter in Q v Q the President noted that HMCTS would provide an interpreter in domestic violence cases or those involving children and commented [at para 53) that where appropriate and if no one else could pay “HMCTS will also, I imagine, pay for the translation of documents needed”, and noted that he had made orders to this effect in this and other cases.

As regards the attendance of the expert the President referred to the requirement that expert evidence should only be obtained when necessary to assist the court in resolving the proceedings ‘justly’ (s 13(6) Children and Families Act 2014).

He said

“56.In principle, the first question in that situation must be, is it, in the view of the court, “necessary”, if the proceedings are to be resolved “justly”, to have the expert in court to answer questions, or will it suffice for the court to be able to read the expert’s report? If the proceedings can be resolved “justly” without requiring the expert’s attendance, then there is no reason why public funds should be spent on something which is, on this hypothesis, unnecessary. If, on the other hand, it is necessary for the expert to attend court to enable the proceedings to be resolved justly – and that must always be a question for determination by the case management judge, not for mere agreement between the parties – then it follows, in my judgment, that the obligation on the State is to provide the necessary funding if a litigant through poverty is unable to pay the cost.

57.In the final analysis, if there is no other properly available public purse, that cost has, in my judgment to be borne by the court, by HMCTS. It is, after all, the court which, in accordance with FPR 1.1, has imposed on it the duty of dealing with the case justly. And, in the final analysis, it is the court which has the duty of ensuring compliance with Articles 6 and 8 in relation to the proceedings before it.”

What if the litigant does not have access to competent legal advice on the difficult questions raised by the allegations against the fathers, raising questions as to whether they are compellable witnesses and the extent to which they could be required to answer – matters the President described as “deep waters”?

The problems from the lack of representation generally were exacerbated by the “acute tensions” where an alleged perpetrator might cross-examine an alleged victim. This had been raise in 2006 in H v L and R [2006] EWHC 3099 (Fam), [2007] 2 FLR 162,

In the President’s view S31G(6) clearly anticipated questions being put by someone other than the judge and he held [at para 79]

“In the ultimate analysis, if the criteria in section 31G(6) are satisfied, and if the judge is satisfied that the essential requirements of a fair trial as required by FPR 1.1 and Articles 6 and 8 cannot otherwise be met, the effect of the words “cause to be put” in section 31G(6) is, in my judgment, to enable the judge to direct that appropriate representation is to be provided by – at the expense of – the court, that is, at the expense of HMCTS.”

Applying this to the cases before him the President noted that the issues in Re B had been resolved. If the father’s application for exceptional funding in Q v Q was not granted the costs of the experts, whose attendance the judge found to be necessary, would have to be met by the court.

With regard to Re C the President concluded:

85. I have however come to two conclusions which I can and ought to set out. The first is that the matters to which I have referred above (in particular those relating to the issues of privilege and related issues) are matters on which the father in Re B, and even more so the father in Re C, desperately needs access to skilled legal advice, both before and during the fact-finding hearing. These are not matters which the judge conducting the fact-finding hearing can determine without the benefit of legal argument on both sides. If the judge is deprived of adversarial argument, and if the father is denied access to legal advice both before and during the hearing, there must, in my judgment, be a very real risk of the father’s rights under Articles 6 and 8 being breached both in the family proceedings and possibly also, in the case of the father in Re C, in the criminal proceedings. I bear in mind, of course, that, as I explained in Re X Children [2007] EWHC 1719 (Fam), [2008] 1 FLR 589, para 51, the admissibility in the criminal proceedings of any admissions made in the family proceedings is in the final analysis a matter for the criminal, not the family, judge. But this does not, in my judgment, meet the difficulty.

86.Linked to this there is, in the case of the father in Re C, a related point made by Ms Bazley. The proper – the fair and just – management of the case requires, in my judgment, that I give directions inter alia requiring the father to respond to the mother’s allegations and to file all the evidence upon which he intends to rely. Ms Bazley submits with some force, and I am inclined to agree, that to require the father to comply with that part of the order without access to proper legal advice is to imperil his rights under Articles 6 and 8.

87.I add only this. If, on the merits, the circumstances in Re B were such as to bring the father’s application within section 10(2)(a) of LASPO, and the LAA has conceded the point, then it might be thought that the father’s claim in Re C is a fortiori.

88.If the father’s application for public funding under LASPO is successful, then all well and good. If it is not, then I will have to consider what, if any, further order to make. I am inclined to think that, for all the reasons already indicated, the father in Re C requires access to legal advice beforehand and representation at the fact-finding hearing to avoid the very real risk of the court being unable to deal with the matter justly and fairly and of his rights under Articles 6 and 8 being breached. I am inclined to think, therefore, that, if he is unable to afford representation and pro bono representation is not available, and if there is no other properly available public purse, the cost will have to be borne by HMCTS.”

The President emphasized that directions that HMCTs should meet the cost of certain activities should only be met as a last resort and then only following consultation with a HCJ or designated family judge. Such directions may or may not be appropriate in cases which involve allegations of either serious non-sexual assault or of sexual assaults of a less serious nature.

Comment:  The President concluded that the Ministry of Justice, the LAA and the Courts Service “may wish to consider the implications” of his judgment.  It is likely that this will have far-reaching implications in the most extreme cases and no doubt will be considered by practitioners involved in other cases where the facts are different but where the lack of funding- including even exceptional funding- gives rise to a “very real risk” that the Court cannot deal with the matter fairly.   In the Court of Protection context the issue of funding for expert evidence is a familiar one, and is also affected by the decision of the Court of Appeal in JG v The Lord Chancellor and others: [2014] EWCA Civ 656.

 

 

 

The costs of non-compliance

 

The case of LB of Bexley v V, W and D [2014] EWHC 2187 (Fam) contains a stark reminder of the need to comply with court directions concerning the filing of evidence. The local authority in this case failed to file its evidence in accordance with deadlines which had already been extended, and despite the court stating that if any party was going to be unable to comply with the extended deadlines, it should apply to the judge’s clerk for an extension. It was said on the local authority’s behalf that no application was made as the local authority did not know when it would be able to produce its evidence. Unsurprisingly, the court was not impressed, but fortunately it was possible for amended directions to be given which enabled all parties to file their evidence without jeopardising the final hearing in the proceedings. The local authority was criticised and required to pay the costs of the hearing:

“I understand that social work professionals and lawyers, whether engaged by public authorities or in private practice, are under enormous great strain in the current circumstances and economic climate, particularly given changes to public funding, but that does not relieve them of the obligation to comply with orders made by the court. The failures by the London Borough of Bexley in this matter are stark. This hearing would not have been required if they had complied with their orders and, in my judgment, it was right that this matter was listed at the earliest opportunity to address those failings and to enable the other parties to make submissions as to when they could comply with their obligations to file documents. Accordingly, I am in no doubt that it is right that the local authority should be ordered to pay the costs of this hearing.” 

Similar approaches may well be taken by judges in the Court of Protection, particularly where failures to meet court deadlines delay the substantive determination of an application. And we would note the case of Re W (Children) [2014] EWFC 22 as a further example of the very robust approach that is being taken in family cases – in the context of much tighter rules in the FPR; we anticipate that it is only a matter of time before the COPR includes similar provisions and a similar approach is taken in CoP cases.

[A version of this note appeared in the August 2014 Thirty Nine Essex Street Mental Capacity Law Newsletter]

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Out of hours medical treatment applications – the key principles

In Sandwell and West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust v CD & Ors [2014] EWCOP 23, Theis J has set out clear guidance that must be followed in out of hours medical treatment cases (and is wider application for other out or hours applications before the CoP).   By way of context AB, a 20 year old woman with a multiple disabilities including a severe learning disability and cerebral palsy. She was admitted to hospital on 12 June 2014; her condition was such that her treating medical team wished to make an application for declarations that, in the event of her condition deteriorating, it would not be in her best interests to receive certain forms of life-sustaining treatment.   Legal advice had been sought by the Trust after a discussion with her father on 17 June; the parents met with Trust representatives on 19 June, and the application application was initially made to Theis J as the out of hours judge at about 5.15 pm on Friday 20 June 2014. The only information she had was the application, some medical notes and a two page document from Dr Y, the joint speciality lead in critical care medicine at the hospital. The Official Solicitor was not represented – differing reasons for this being given in the judgment; the mother joined the hearing by telephone, but it transpired that she was taking that call in the public area of the hospital.   Theis J took steps to contact the Official Solicitor who was able to arrange for Counsel; the hearing re-commenced at about 7.30 pm that date with counsel for the Trust and the OS in court and the parents and Dr Y on the end of a telephone. It had not been possible to secure representation for the parents in the short time available. Matters then ultimately progressed to an agreed order at a hearing on 30 July 2014 that it was not in AB’s best interests to be given certain life sustaining treatment.

Theis J was, however, sufficiently concerned about the timing and practical arrangements for the out of hours hearing on Friday 20 June that, having endorsed the order, she gave guidance which merits reproduction in full.

“35. I, of course, accept that in cases involving medical treatment, or the withholding of such treatment, it can be a difficult judgment as to when to make an application. This has to be looked at in the context of the realities of the situation in a critical care unit in a Trust such as this one. The person who is the subject of the application is not the only patient being cared for by the clinical team, and the situation can evolve on the ground quite quickly. I recognise also that I am considering these aspects with the benefit of hindsight, and after hearing submissions from counsel who are specialist in this field.

36.  However, those considering making such applications should err on the side of making applications earlier rather than later. By doing so the necessary safeguards will be put in place in advance to support an effective hearing taking place, rather than risk what happened here, where those important safeguards had to be put in place as the hearing unfolded (such as involvement of the OS, ensuring the parents had the documents the court had and somewhere private from where they could participate in the hearing). This was particularly difficult in this case due to the time when the application was made, namely late on a Friday afternoon into the evening.

37.  It must have been clear from the 17 June that there was an issue relating to this between the Trust and the parents; the medical records record the Trust sought legal advice then. The issuing of an application would not prevent efforts continuing to seek to resolve matters; they can, and should, run in parallel. But importantly, issuing the application earlier would have meant it was more likely there would have been an effective on notice hearing, with all parties being represented and their Article 6 rights being fully protected.

38.  It is essential there is compliance with the relevant Court of Protection Practice Directions, in this context in particular PD9E Applications relating to the serious medical treatment and PD10B Urgent and interim applications.

39.  In the situation I was presented with on 20 June some basic steps had not been taken and, with the benefit of hindsight, they should have been. These included

(1) Making suitable and sensitive arrangements for the parents to be able to participate in the hearing. Clearly joining a hearing such as this from a public waiting room in the hospital was not suitable. There did not appear to be anyone on the ground at the hospital to assist the parents in relation to participating with this hearing, there should have been. The parents had solicitors advising them and every effort should have been made for them to be able to represent the parents at a hearing as important as this one. If the application had been issued earlier in the week it is likely the parents’ solicitor would have been able to secure public funding for them. As their solicitor states in his statement ‘If I had been given 2 days notice of this application I could have obtained legal aid for the [parents]. In my view this would have made a great deal of difference to them. The experience of going to court over the issue of whether life-sustaining treatment should be withheld from one’s child is extremely stressful even if one has proper legal representation, and I do not believe that families should be put in this position other than in the most urgent of cases, which this was not. The desirability of there being equality of arms between parties in cases involving life and death should be made clear to Trusts in my view.’ I agree wholeheartedly with those sentiments.

(2) Not alerting the OS to the application with sufficient time to get a direction from the court for him to be invited to represent AB. Paragraph 8 of PD9E makes it clear the OS is prepared to discuss applications in relation to serious medical treatment before an application is made. The medical notes could have been sent over in the morning of 20 June to the OS. There was no issue in this case AB lacked capacity. Ms Paterson has informed me that in serious medical treatment cases, where the applicant is a Trust or other public body, the OS will expect the applicant to agree to pay one half of his costs acting as a solicitor for P. Where agreement to do so is readily given, matters can then proceed without costs’ questions distracting his case manager. He will, of course, act as P’s litigation friend and solicitor without such agreement, seeking an order from the court if the agreement is not forthcoming.

(3) The court is there to assist in applications such as this one; the Urgent Applications Judge and the Clerk of the Rules should be alerted at the earliest opportunity that an application is likely and, in suitable cases, application promptly made for a direction for the OS to be invited to act where an application is realistically anticipated, as it clearly was in this case. This should have been done (at the very latest) by 2pm on 20 June. This would have enabled the OS to see the papers and start making enquiries at the earliest opportunity. Proper and effective contingency plans for a hearing that is likely must be put in place at the earliest opportunity, not, as happened in this case, left to the last minute.

(4) It is essential when making this type of application, particularly one that is made out of hours, that a word version of the draft order is available so any amendments can be made promptly.

(5) The statement in support of the out of hours application gave no information regarding the history or AB’s quality of life. Such information is essential material for the court when considering the context in which such an application is being made. There was nothing to prevent that information being obtained in tandem with the clinical and medical evidence justifying the application. The evidence was clear that there were a number of clinicians involved in treating AB. If the application had been made earlier this information would have been readily available.

40.  These observations, although made in the context of an application concerning an adult within proceedings in the Court of Protection, apply equally in similar proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction concerning medical treatment or the withholding of medical treatment for a child (in which CAFCASS Legal as opposed to the Official Solicitor would act on behalf of the child), where the relevant provisions in Part 12 FPR 2010 and PD12E Urgent Business apply.

41.  As I hope I have made clear these comments are made with the benefit of hindsight. It is recognised that on the ground difficult professional judgments have to be made, and there will remain truly urgent cases that require applications to be made out of hours. However, I hope the message is clear that in this type of case; where significant medical treatment or withholding of treatment is at issue, or likely to be at issue, applications should be made sooner rather than later. As Mr Sachdeva and Ms Paterson submitted, this will ensure all the necessary safeguards are in place in terms of legal representation and notification to the Press. In addition, the advantages of a hearing taking place in normal court hours includes the court being able to hear parties and evidence in person, and proper recording facilities being in place.”

To fact-find or not to fact-find?

In LBX v TT and others [2014] EWCOP 24, Cobb J has given important guidance on when to hold a fact-finding hearing, and when to hear oral evidence.

Summary

TT was a 19 year old woman with moderate learning disabilities and global developmental delay. In November 2012, she alleged that her stepfather had sexually assaulted her and forced her to watch pornographic videos. She was placed in adult foster care and her stepfather was awaiting trial in the Crown Court. As a result of significant concessions by the parents, rather than a three-day hearing to conduct a full enquiry into the allegations, Cobb J was able to proceed to a more limited factual enquiry, principally directed to the issue of contact between TT and her mother (‘MJ’).

One issue was whether, in light of the concessions, the court could make orders upon an agreed basis of facts without having to make factual findings. Or, given that TT’s mother’s stance on contact would be likely to change following her husband’s trial, whether a fact-finding hearing should proceed. Cobb J reiterated the principle that he who asserts must prove on the balance of probabilities, as described by Lord Hoffman in Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35 at §2:

“If a legal rule requires a fact to be proved (a ‘fact in issue’), a judge or jury must decide whether or not it happened. There is no room for a finding that it might have happened. The law operates a binary system in which the only values are 0 and 1. The fact either happened or it did not. If the tribunal is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by a rule that one party or the other carries the burden of proof. If the party who bears the burden of proof fails to discharge it, a value of 0 is returned and the fact is treated as not having happened. If he does discharge it, a value of 1 is returned and the fact is treated as having happened”.

In determining what factors should influence the exercise of the court’s discretion in deciding whether these should be a finding of fact hearing at the interim or final hearing, his Lordship drew upon some analogous jurisprudence from the family courts:

“46. I have had the relative luxury of three days of court time set aside to determine these issues; the court will however often be constrained by sheer practicalities of time and opportunity for an oral hearing. In each situation, the Judge surely has to make a determination – often under pressure of time – as to how far he or she can go to test the material.   By analogy with the position in family law, the judge would in my judgment be well-served to consider the guidance of Butler-Sloss LJ in the family appeal of Re B (Minors)(Contact) [1994] 2 FLR 1 in which she said as follows:

‘There is a spectrum of procedure for family cases from the ex parte application on minimal evidence to the full and detailed investigations on oral evidence which may be prolonged. Where on that spectrum a judge decides a particular application should be placed is a matter for his discretion. Applications for residence orders or for committal to the care of a local authority or revocation of a care order are likely to be decided on full oral evidence, but not invariably. Such is not the case on contact applications which may be and are heard sometimes with and sometimes without oral evidence or with a limited amount of oral evidence.’

It is acknowledged that the ‘spectrum’ may now be narrower than that described in 1994 following the revisions to rule 22.7 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, but the principle nonetheless remains, in my judgment, good.

47. Butler–Sloss LJ went on to define the questions which may have a bearing on how the court should proceed with such an application (adapted for relevance to the Court of Protection):

i. Whether there is sufficient evidence upon which to make the relevant decision;

ii. Whether the proposed evidence (which should be available at least in outline) which the applicant for a full trial wishes to adduce is likely to affect the outcome of the proceedings;

iii; Whether the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for the professional care or other agency, in particular in this case the expert witnesses, is likely to affect the outcome of the proceedings;

iv. The welfare of P and the effect of further litigation – whether the delay in itself will be so detrimental to P’s well-being that exceptionally there should not be a full hearing. This may be because of the urgent need to reach a decision in relation to P;

v. The prospects of success of the applicant for a full trial;

vi. Does the justice of the case require a full investigation with oral evidence?

48.  In deciding whether to conduct a fact-finding hearing at all, I consider it useful to consider the check-list of considerations discussed by McFarlane J in the case of A County Council v DP, RS, BS (By their Children’s Guardian) [2005] EWHC 1593 (Fam) 2005 2 FLR 1031 at [24]. Following a review of case-law relevant to the issue he stated that:

“… amongst other factors, the following are likely to be relevant and need to be borne in mind before deciding whether or not to conduct a particular fact finding exercise:

a. the interests of the child (which are relevant but not paramount

b. the time that the investigation will take;

c. the likely cost to public funds;

d. the evidential result;

e. the necessity or otherwise of the investigation;

f. the relevance of the potential result of the investigation to the future care plans for the child;

g. the impact of any fact finding process upon the other parties;

h. the prospects of a fair trial on the issue;

i. the justice of the case.”

49.  There is some (but not universal) acknowledgement at the Bar in this case that this list (with modifications as to (a) to refer to the best interests of ‘P’ rather than ‘the child’) provides a useful framework of issues to consider in relation to the necessity of fact finding in the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection.”

According, Cobb J decided to conduct a limited fact-finding exercise and made resulting declarations and decisions. This included an authorisation to deprive TT of her liberty in the foster home.

Comment

When to hold fact-finding hearings in the Court of Protection is an issue in respect of which – unlike in relation to children – there is no guidance and a paucity of reported cases. The topic is discussed in some detail in the chapter 15 of the Court of Protection Handbook  in which Alex expressed the view that a useful analogy could be drawn with the pre-MCA case of Re S (adult’s lack of capacity: carer and residence) [2003] EWHC 1909 (Fam), [2003] 2 FLR 1235. However, this decision of Cobb J is by far the most comprehensive to date in terms of its analysis.   Until and unless a Practice Direction or Practice Guidance is produced setting out a framework, it is suggested that the model set out by Cobb J is one that will be of considerable assistance to practitioners and judges in determining whether a fact-finding hearing is required and the need for oral evidence. It should, though, be recalled, that the tenor of recent judgments from the Family Division/Court of Appeal is that very considerable caution should be exercised before a separate fact-finding hearing is listed (see, for instance, Re S, Cambridgeshire County Council v PS and others [2014] EWCA Civ 25).

[A version of this note appeared in the August 2014 Thirty Nine Essex Street Mental Capacity Law Newsletter]