Professional Deputies: Hourly rates and the realities of 2020

In a judgment handed down on 30 September 2020, PLK & Ors (Court of Protection : Costs) [2020] EWHC B28, Master Whalan has considered the concerns the method of assessment of the hourly rates claimed by Deputies. The SCCO consolidated the assessments in four cases that chosen to represent the costs claimed by Deputies in different parts of England, in the management of the affairs of protected parties who had sustained significant brain or birth injuries.  The central submission of the deputies was that the court’s current approach, which, broadly speaking, relied on the application of the Guidelines Hourly Rates (‘GHR’) approved by the Costs Committee of the Civil Justice Council was, by 2020, incorrect and unjust.  Instead, they submitted, the assessment of COP work should be predicated on a more flexible exercise of the discretion conferred by CPR 44.3(3), whereby the GHR were utilised as merely a ‘starting point’ and not a ‘starting and end point’.

Master Whalan did not accept the primary argument of the applicants that COP firms had experienced

29. […] ‘a significant increase in hard and soft overheads’ (SA, 45).  The evidence, both in respect of time and expenditure, is inconsistent and, in my view, incomplete.  Nor am I persuaded by the submission made in the oral hearing that ‘it is clear that no other area of practice requires such a level of unrecoverable time’. So far as the datum is consistent and stable – and, as noted, the most reliable figures are probably those produced by Clarion – it suggests a comparatively modest incidence of time and expenditure.  However reliable the figures produced may be, they do not, in my view, demonstrate that the burden is one that is exclusive to COP work or that it is atypically high in comparison with that experienced by practitioners in comparable areas of practice.  Fee earners in personal injury, medical and professional negligence, for example, incur invariably time and expense that is irrecoverable, in marketing, accessing cases that are not proceeded with or, indeed, pursued and lost.  These are burdens which do not apply to Deputy’s sources of work (on a case by case basis) which is often consistent and predictable over many years.

However:

Three preliminary observations then inform my initial approach to the applicants’ secondary argument.  First, it should be emphasised from the outset that this court has no power to review or amend the GHR, either formally or informally, as this role is the exclusive preserve of the Civil Justice Council.  This reality is recognised properly by Mr Wilcock in his written and oral submissions.  Secondly, while the court has received submissions concerning the application of an inflationary uplift when applying the GHR, this is not just a ‘blunt tool’, but an approach which endorses the application of a practise which has been rejected explicitly since 2014, from which time the emphasis has been on a ‘comprehensive, evidence based review’.  Thirdly, however, it must be acknowledged that the GHR cannot be applied fairly as an index of reasonable remuneration unless these rates are subject to some form of periodic, upwards review.  O’Farrell J. in Ohpen (ibid) observed that it ‘is unsatisfactory that the guidelines are based on rates fixed in 2010’ as these ‘are not helpful in determining reasonable rates in 2019’. These observations were made in the context of an assessment of London City solicitor rates in an assessment where the court was not bound by the GHR.  It seems clear to me that the failure to review the GHR since 2010 constitutes an omission which is not simply regrettable but seriously problematic where the GHR form the ‘going rates’ applied on assessment.  I do not merely express some empathy for Deputies engaged in COP work, I recognise also the force in the submission that the failure to review the GHR since 2010 threatens the viability of work that is fundamental to the operation of the COP and the court system generally.

Against this backdrop, Master Whalan concluded that

35. I am satisfied that in 2020 the GHR cannot be applied reasonably or equitably without some form of monetary uplift that recognises the erosive effect of inflation and, no doubt, other commercial pressures since the last formal review in 2010.  I am conscious equally of the fact that I have no power to review or amend the GHR.  Accordingly my finding and, in turn, my direction to Costs Officers conducting COP assessments is that they should exercise some broad, pragmatic flexibility when applying the 2010 GHR to the hourly rates claimed.  If the hourly rates claimed fall within approximately 120% of the 2010 GHR, then they should be regarded as being prima facie reasonable.  Rates claimed above this level will be correspondingly unreasonable. To assist with the practical conduct of COP assessments, I produce a table below which demonstrates the effect of a 20% uplift of the 2010 GHR.  I stress again that I do not purport to revise the GHR, as this court has no power to do so; instead this is a practical attempt to assist Costs Officers and avoid unnecessary delay (caused by individual re-calculation) in a busy department conducting over 8000 COP assessments per annum.

Master Whalan indicated that

This approach can be adopted immediately and is applicable to all outstanding bills, regardless of whether the period is to 2018, 2019, 2020 or subsequently.  It goes without saying that this approach is subject ultimately to the recommendations of Mr Justice Stewart and his Hourly Rates Working Group and the Civil Justice Council. Ultimately the recommendations of the Working Group must be adopted in preference to my findings.

Subsequent to the decision, the Senior Costs Judge issued a Practice Note explaining some of the practical consequences.

Court of Protection telephone hearings at First Avenue House

The Court of Protection will be giving the following instructions in relation to telephone hearings at First Avenue House, responding to uncertainties as to responsibilities and costs.   They are to be read with the Guidance on Remote Hearings published by the Vice-President on 31 March 2020.

Dear All,

Please find below dial in details for the telephone hearing listed before judge xyz on date at time.

JOIN USING YOUR PHONE

  1. Choose the correct phone number to dial:

– Freephone 0800 917 1956

– United Kingdom Direct: 0203 463 9741

– International dial in +44203 463 9741

  1. At the phone prompt, provide the participant passcode: 5########## followed by #

Important Information

The charge for the connection to your remote hearing is paid for by HMCTS. However, charges may be applied by your service provider and may vary depending on what contract you currently have with them. It is your responsibility to check whether you will be charged for this connection with your network provider

The participant passcode is for one time use only.

[Note, the reference to ‘charges’ in the passage in bold is a reference to the fact that, if the right number is not used, the call will not be free – on some networks, 0800 will be the Freephone number; on others the 0203 number].

Court of Protection fees refund

The Ministry of Justice has introduced a refund scheme relating to court fees, including the Court of Protection.  For the Court of Protection, the scheme relates to those who paid court fees between 1 April 2016 and 31 March 2018 for:

  • applications
  •  appeals

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Capture1In addition, if you paid a hearing fee between 1 April 2017 and 31 March 2018, you may also be eligible for a refund.

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Capture2For more details, see here. and the guidance document here.

Queries regarding the scheme should be directed to the helpdesk as follows:

Telephone: 0300 1233077

Email: Civil_Refunds@justice.gov.uk.

E-Filing for the assessment of Professional Deputy costs is compulsory from 20.01.2020

Professional Deputies are entitled to general management costs which are reasonable and proportionate to the total value of the client’s estate. The amount of work done and that any work done should be done by the appropriate fee earner. Last but not least, the professional deputy is required to demonstrate they are acting in their client’s best interests. Professional Deputies who are appointed by the Court of Protection are required to submit estimates of costs and bills for assessment at the end of a reporting period.

From Monday 20 January 2020, deputies are required to send a Bill of Costs, N258 and authority to assess (deputyship order) through the e-filing system in PDF Format.

Bills of costs submitted in paper form will be rejected by the Senior Courts Cost Office (SCCO) after this date. Any files submitted after this date in paper form will be returned.

How to E-File

To E-File, your firm should register as a user on the E-Filer system using an email address and password.

You can register by clicking here – scroll to the bottom of the page and select register as an e-filer.

Guidance on the SCCO e-filing system works is here.

Guidance from the HMCTs is also available here.

Costs that can be claimed

Practice Direction 19B sets out the fixed costs that may be claimed by solicitors and office holders in public authorities appointed to act as deputy for P.

You can find the Practice Direction here.

Fees

Payment can no longer be made to the SCCO by way of cheque. The firm must have a PBA or debit payment facility.

To find out more about applying for  PBA accounts click here.

[This post was written for us by Hannah Nicholas, @thecapacitycat]

 

Costs, HRA damages and the CoP

In Re TL [2017] EWCOP 1, Baker J has confirmed that, where claims for damages and/or declarations under the HRA 1998 are brought in the Court of Protection, the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rather than the Court of Protection Costs Rules will apply (see paras 33 and 34).  In consequence, the normal costs rules – and risks – applying to civil litigation will apply.

That having been said, and in light of the recent spate of cases concerning HRA claims and care proceedings covered in the March 39 Essex Chambers Mental Capacity Report (to which can also be added Re SW & Re TW [2017] EWHC 450 (Fam)), it is increasingly obvious that it will only rarely be appropriate to bring such HRA cases within the four walls of the CoP.  Rather, separate County Court (or High Court proceedings) should be brought – or at least intimated, with settlement or other ADR being infinitely preferable.

“A sensible decision, not the pursuit of perfection”

Mr Justice Peter Jackson has expressed concern about the costs and delay – and associated “human misery” and drain on manpower- in two Court of Protection cases, which in his conservative estimate cost around £9,000 per month, largely paid for by the State.

 

You can read his strong judgment here. It echoes some of the comments made in the family sphere (V v V, [2011] EWHC 1190 (FAM); J v J [2014] EWHC (Fam)).

 

The following comments should be noted by practitioners:

 

  • The inconsistency of “extravagance” in CoP proceedings with the parties’ duty to assist the court in furthering the over-riding objective;
  • The importance of restraining excessive costs where P’s money is being spent on deciding his future, whether he likes it or not
  • The judge’s criticism of the “search for the ideal solution, leading to decent but imperfect solutions being rejected”- s1(5) “calls for a sensible decision, not the pursuit of perfection;
  • It is not necessary to take up “every conceivable legal or factual issue, rather than concentrating on the issues that really need to be resolved”.
  • The need for professional co-operation. Here the judge noted the role of the litigation friend in one of the cases: “This was epitomised in Case A, where the litigation friend’s submission focussed heavily on alleged shortcomings by the local authority, even to the extent that it was accompanied by a dense document entitled “Chronology of Faults”. But despite this, the author had no alternative solution to offer. The role of the litigation friend in representing P’s interests is not merely a passive one, discharged by critiquing other peoples’ efforts. Where he considers it in his client’s interest, he is entitled to research and present any realistic alternatives.“

 

 

 

The judge concluded:

 

  1. “The main responsibility for this situation and its solution must lie with the court, which has the power to control its proceedings. The purpose of this judgment is to express the view that the case management provisions in the Court of Protection Rules have proved inadequate on their own to secure the necessary changes in practice. While cases about children and cases about incapacitated adults have differences, their similarities are also obvious. There is a clear procedural analogy to be drawn between many welfare proceedings in the Court of Protection and proceedings under the Children Act. As a result of the Public Law Outline, robust case management, use of experts only where necessary, judicial continuity, and a statutory time-limit, the length of care cases has halved in two years. Yet Court of Protection proceedings can commonly start with no timetable at all for their conclusion, nor any early vision of what an acceptable outcome would look like. The young man in Case B is said to have a mental age of 8. What would we now say if it took five years – or 18 months – to decide the future of an 8-year-old?
  2. I therefore believe that the time has come to introduce the same disciplines in the Court of Protection as now apply in the Family Court. Accordingly, and at his request, I am sending a copy of this judgment to the President of the Court of Protection, Sir James Munby, for his consideration.”

 

 

The costs of non-compliance

 

The case of LB of Bexley v V, W and D [2014] EWHC 2187 (Fam) contains a stark reminder of the need to comply with court directions concerning the filing of evidence. The local authority in this case failed to file its evidence in accordance with deadlines which had already been extended, and despite the court stating that if any party was going to be unable to comply with the extended deadlines, it should apply to the judge’s clerk for an extension. It was said on the local authority’s behalf that no application was made as the local authority did not know when it would be able to produce its evidence. Unsurprisingly, the court was not impressed, but fortunately it was possible for amended directions to be given which enabled all parties to file their evidence without jeopardising the final hearing in the proceedings. The local authority was criticised and required to pay the costs of the hearing:

“I understand that social work professionals and lawyers, whether engaged by public authorities or in private practice, are under enormous great strain in the current circumstances and economic climate, particularly given changes to public funding, but that does not relieve them of the obligation to comply with orders made by the court. The failures by the London Borough of Bexley in this matter are stark. This hearing would not have been required if they had complied with their orders and, in my judgment, it was right that this matter was listed at the earliest opportunity to address those failings and to enable the other parties to make submissions as to when they could comply with their obligations to file documents. Accordingly, I am in no doubt that it is right that the local authority should be ordered to pay the costs of this hearing.” 

Similar approaches may well be taken by judges in the Court of Protection, particularly where failures to meet court deadlines delay the substantive determination of an application. And we would note the case of Re W (Children) [2014] EWFC 22 as a further example of the very robust approach that is being taken in family cases – in the context of much tighter rules in the FPR; we anticipate that it is only a matter of time before the COPR includes similar provisions and a similar approach is taken in CoP cases.

[A version of this note appeared in the August 2014 Thirty Nine Essex Street Mental Capacity Law Newsletter]

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