The quarterly update to the Court of Protection Handbook (1 May 2020) is now online, available here. It builds on the previous update (1 February 2020) to provide a comprehensive updating to the text of the third edition of the book, and includes both the key materials relating to the impact of COVID-19 on the functioning of the Court, and significant cases on practice and procedure in the last 6 months.
Author: aruckkeene
Remote hearings – the Court of Appeal’s stock-take
In two decisions handed down on 30 April 2020, Re A (Children) (Remote Hearings) [2020] EWCA Civ 583 and Re B (Children) (Remote Hearing : Interim Care Order) [2020] EWCA Civ 584, the Court of Appeal undertook a stock-take of the position in relation to remote hearings. Both were decided by Sir Andrew McFarlane, the President of the Family Division, and Davies and Peter Jackson LJJ. Re B is primarily of importance for indicating how the pressures of the current situation led to a series of cumulative missteps, including by the Guardian and the judge. In Re A, the Court of Appeal to set out a number of “cardinal points and relevant factors with a view to assisting courts to make appropriate decisions in this changing landscape.” Although the cases concerned children, the principles are equally applicable to cases before the Court of Protection.
The key points from Re A are as follows:
Paragraph 3:
i) The decision whether to conduct a remote hearing, and the means by which each individual case may be heard, are a matter for the judge or magistrate who is to conduct the hearing. It is a case management decision over which the first instance court will have a wide discretion, based on the ordinary principles of fairness, justice and the need to promote the welfare of the subject child or children. An appeal is only likely to succeed where a particular decision falls outside the range of reasonable ways of proceeding that were open to the court and is, therefore, held to be wrong.
ii) Guidance or indications issued by the senior judiciary as to those cases which might, or might not, be suitable for a remote hearing are no more than that, namely guidance or illustrations aimed at supporting the judge or magistrates in deciding whether or not to conduct a remote hearing in a particular case.
iii) The temporary nature of any guidance, indications or even court decisions on the issue of remote hearings should always be remembered. This will become all the more apparent once the present restrictions on movement start to be gradually relaxed. From week to week the experience of the courts and the profession is developing, so that what might, or might not, have been considered appropriate at one time may come to be seen as inappropriate at a later date, or vice versa. For example, it is the common experience of many judges that remote hearings take longer to set up and undertake than normal face-to-face hearings; consequently, courts are now listing fewer cases each day than was the case some weeks ago. On the other hand, some court buildings remain fully open and have been set up for safe, socially isolated, hearings and it may now be possible to consider that a case may be heard safely in those courts when that was not the case in the early days of ‘lockdown’.
Paragraph 9:
The factors that are likely to influence the decision on whether to proceed with a remote hearing will vary from case to case, court to court and judge to judge. We consider that they will include:
i) The importance and nature of the issue to be determined; is the outcome that is sought an interim or final order?
ii) Whether there is a special need for urgency, or whether the decision could await a later hearing without causing significant disadvantage to the child or the other parties;
iii) Whether the parties are legally represented;
iv) The ability, or otherwise, of any lay party (particularly a parent or person with parental responsibility) to engage with and follow remote proceedings meaningfully. This factor will include access to and familiarity with the necessary technology, funding, intelligence/personality, language, ability to instruct their lawyers (both before and during the hearing), and other matters;
v) Whether evidence is to be heard or whether the case will proceed on the basis of submissions only;
vi) The source of any evidence that is to be adduced and assimilated by the court. For example, whether the evidence is written or oral, given by a professional or lay witness, contested or uncontested, or factual or expert evidence;
vii) The scope and scale of the proposed hearing. How long is the hearing expected to last?
viii) The available technology; telephone or video, and if video, which platform is to be used. A telephone hearing is likely to be a less effective medium than using video;
ix) The experience and confidence of the court and those appearing before the court in the conduct of remote hearings using the proposed technology;
x) Any safe (in terms of potential COVID 19 infection) alternatives that may be available for some or all of the participants to take part in the court hearing by physical attendance in a courtroom before the judge or magistrates.
The facts of Re A illustrate the challenges faced at the moment, in the context of an individual (the child’s father) with “limited abilities, and some disabilities, which render him less able to take part in a remote hearing. He has been diagnosed as dyslexic. He is unused to reading. He has a short attention span, is emotionally fragile and brittle and quickly becomes exasperated.” The Court of Appeal emphasised that “[t]he concept of fairness and the need for a lay party to ‘engage’ in the process includes the ability of that person to follow and to understand what transpires at a court hearing at least to an adequate degree and then to be able to instruct their lawyers adequately and in a timely manner.” The Court of Appeal also considered problematic the approach proposed by the judge a hybrid one which would have seen the parents giving evidence before him in person in court, but in the absence of their representatives (who would attend by video):
58. […] Recently, in the judgment given in Re P (A Child: Remote Hearings) [2020] EWFC 32 at paragraph 26 the President stressed the importance of the court being able to see all the parties in the court room. Although that case was specifically directed to the hearing of allegations of Factitious or Induced Illness, the more general point that a judge will be in a better position to assess the evidence of a witness who gives evidence live from a witness box than one who speaks over a video link is plainly right. There is, however, a need for caution when the only witness(es) required to attend court are the lay parties when others, for example the key social worker, are not. When a lay party is required to attend court, but his or her advocate is not, the cause for concern at the imbalance in the process must be heightened. Consideration must be given to the potentially exposed position of a witness giving live evidence in front of a judge in the absence of his or her lawyers or any of the other parties and in response to questions asked over a video link. The judge does not appear to have considered whether in this particular case it was reasonable to expect these parents to be placed in that potentially daunting position. When this is placed in the balance alongside the other factors which establish a lack of a fair process it gives them additional weight.
Court of Protection telephone hearings at First Avenue House
The Court of Protection will be giving the following instructions in relation to telephone hearings at First Avenue House, responding to uncertainties as to responsibilities and costs. They are to be read with the Guidance on Remote Hearings published by the Vice-President on 31 March 2020.
Dear All,
Please find below dial in details for the telephone hearing listed before judge xyz on date at time.
JOIN USING YOUR PHONE
- Choose the correct phone number to dial:
– Freephone 0800 917 1956
– United Kingdom Direct: 0203 463 9741
– International dial in +44203 463 9741
- At the phone prompt, provide the participant passcode: 5########## followed by #
Important Information
The charge for the connection to your remote hearing is paid for by HMCTS. However, charges may be applied by your service provider and may vary depending on what contract you currently have with them. It is your responsibility to check whether you will be charged for this connection with your network provider
The participant passcode is for one time use only.
[Note, the reference to ‘charges’ in the passage in bold is a reference to the fact that, if the right number is not used, the call will not be free – on some networks, 0800 will be the Freephone number; on others the 0203 number].
HIVE update and email address
The HIVE mailbox (hive@justice.gov.uk) is now live, and can be used as the first point of contact to raise specific issues relating to the operation of the Court of Protection during the pandemic. It is not to be used for issues relating to specific cases (for instance case progression or appeals).
The members of the HIVE group are:
- Hayden J
- HHJ Carolyn Hilder
- Sarah Castle (the Official Solicitor)
- Vikram Sachdeva QC
- Lorraine Cavanagh QC
- Nicola Mackintosh QC (Hon)
- Alex Ruck Keene
- Joan Goulbourn (Ministry of Justice)
- Mary MacGregor (Office of Public Guardian)
- Kate Edwards
Court of Protection and COPDOL 11 applications
Senior Judge Hilder has approved the circulation of the following update (17 April 2020) in terms of the approach being taken to COPDOL11 applications during the period of Covid-19 restrictions:
The DoLS team is now accepting COPDOL11 applications by e-mail. Each application received will be added to the current list of matters awaiting determination, so that cases will be considered in order of receipt unless the patient is awaiting discharge from hospital (referral to the resident urgent business judge) or has a planned imminent move date (referral to the next available DoLS judge).
All applications must be complete including medical evidence as without this the court does not have jurisdiction.
The documents must be a separate PDF and clearly identified i.e. DOL11, COP3, Best interest etc.
As a temporary measure whilst the pandemic is restricting normal working, documents will be accepted with an electronic signature. Photographs of any documents provided by the Rule 1.2 Representative are acceptable provided they are fully legible.
Orders are now being sent to Local Authorities and CCGs by e-mail. The care plan (which often runs to 50 or so pages) will not be appended to the e-mail. As the date of the care plan is referred to in the order and Local Authorities/CCGs have their own original copy, hard copies will be sent by post to Local Authority/CCG offices as normal.
Stayed applications are not being progressed during the pandemic because General Visitors are not available. Orders which have already been made lifting a stay will have a longer period for submission of updated documents when the order is issued.
If it is apparent that you are unable to comply with deadlines for filing documents, please inform the DOLS team by e-mail of the proposed date for filing, and we will diarise the matter accordingly. If the progress of the case is affected, the matter will be referred to a judge for consideration.
Please try not to chase us for updates on applications unless there is specific urgency. We are now a team of only 4 staff working hard to assist every LA and CCG in the country.
[For further guidance about the COPDOL11 process more generally, see the 39 Essex Chambers guide here].
Court of Protection priorities during COVID-19
HMCTS has issued its family business priorities for April 2020, i.e. what work must be done, what work will be done, and what work HMCTS will do its best to do. In relation to the Court of Protection, they are divided as follows:
Must be done
- Urgent applications
- Applications under Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 16A and s 21A
- Serious medical treatment cases
- Deprivation of Liberty
- Form COP1 Statutory Wills – where person is near end of life.
- Safeguarding applications via the Office of the Public Guardians
Work that will be done
- Gatekeeping and allocation referrals –care
- Gatekeeping and allocation referrals – private
- Other family care orders/documents/emails
- Court of Protection – welfare cases
Work that “we will do our best to do”
- Court of Protection –property and affairs
Court of Protection remote hearings – guidance from the CPBA
The Court of Protection Bar Association has issued guidance (approved by Hayden J) as to the effective conduct of remote hearings, dated 7 April 2020. It is available here.
Guidance on remote access to the Court of Protection
The Vice-President, Hayden J, has issued on 31 March detailed guidance about remote access to the Court of Protection, including a detailed protocol for remote hearings, consideration of how to secure the principles of transparency before the Court of Protection, and a draft order.
2nd quarterly update to the Handbook
The second quarterly update to the Court of Protection Handbook can now be found here. Although it is primarily of use for those in possession of the Third Edition (and if you are not, you should be!) it is also of use as a summary of case-law relating to practice and procedure since the book was published in July 2019.
What’s the permission threshold?
In Re D (A young man) [2019] EWCOP 1, Mostyn J had to consider a question that had previously been the subject of only very limited judicial consideration, namely the test for permission under s.50 MCA 2005. The case concerned a young man, D, aged 20, with autism. He had been looked after by his father and his stepmother, C, since the age of 3.
D’s mother, who was subject to a civil restraint order, applied for permission to make a substantive application concerning the nature and quantum of her contact with D. Mostyn J granted her leave under the terms of the civil restraint order to make the application for permission to make the application itself.
Under the terms of ss.50(1) and (2) MCA 2005, the mother needed permission to make a substantive application as she did not fall into one of the categories where permission is not required set out in section 50(1). Section 50(3) provides:
In deciding whether to grant permission the court must, in particular, have regard to –
(a) the applicant’s connection with the person to whom the application relates,
(b) the reasons for the application,
(c) the benefit to the person to whom the application relates of a proposed order or directions, and
(d) whether the benefit can be achieved in any other way.
Mostyn J noted that:
4. A permission requirement is a not uncommon feature of our legal procedure. For example, permission is needed to make an application for judicial review. Permission is needed to mount an appeal. Permission is needed to make a claim under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. In the field of judicial review, the permission requirement is not merely there to weed out applications which are abusive or nonsensical: to gain permission the claimant has to demonstrate a good arguable case. Permission to appeal will only be granted where the court is satisfied that the appellant has shown a real prospect of success or some other good reason why an appeal should be heard. Under Part III of the 1984 Act permission will only be granted if the applicant demonstrates solid grounds for making the substantive application: see Agbaje v Akinnoye-Agbaje [2010] UKSC 13 at [33] per Lord Collins. This is said to set the threshold higher than the judicial review threshold of a good arguable case.
5. There is no authority under section 50 giving guidance as to what the threshold is in proceedings under the 2005 Act. In my judgment the appropriate threshold is the same as that applicable in the field of judicial review. The applicant must demonstrate that there is a good arguable case for her to be allowed to apply for review of the present contact arrangements.
The case had had a very lengthy and unhappy history, contact arrangements between D (at that stage a child) and his mother having been fixed some seven years previously. Having rehearsed the history, the possible scope of proceedings before the Court of Protection and (in his view) the irrelevance of the fact that D had turned 18, Mostyn J held that he applied:
13. […] the same standards to this application as I would if I were hearing an oral inter partes application for permission to seek judicial review. I cannot say that I am satisfied that the mother has shown a good arguable case that a substantive application would succeed if permission were granted. Fundamentally, I am not satisfied that circumstances have changed to any material extent since the contact regime was fixed seven years ago and confirmed by me two years ago. I cannot discern any material benefit that would accrue to D if this permission application were granted. On the contrary, I can see the potential for much stress and unhappiness not only for D but also for his family members if the application were to be allowed to proceed.
Mostyn J therefore refused the mother’s application for permission.
Comment
Being pedantic, Mostyn J was not correct to say that there was no authority on s.50. In 2010, Macur J had in NK v v VW [2012] COPLR 105 had refused permission on the basis that she considered that “section 50(3) and the associated Rules require the Court to prevent not only the frivolous and abusive applications but those which have no realistic prospect of success or bear any sense of proportional response to the problem that is envisaged by NK in this case.” Fortunately, not least for procedural enthusiasts, that approach is consistent with the more detailed analysis now given by Mostyn J.
