Costs and test cases

In a short judgment Mr Justice Baker declined to award the Official Solicitor his costs after a CCG withdrew applications in relation to a series of test cases.  You can read the judgment here.

The case concerned applications in relation to the living arrangements of incapacitated adults for whom the CCG had responsibility.  All were living in their own home and the CCG sought clarification as to whether such individuals satisfied the “acid test”.  The CCG also questioned whether the responsibility for any deprivation of liberty was imputable to the state solely by virtue of the fact that it provided NHS care for P.  If either the acid test was not satisfied or the arrangements were not imputable to the state, of course, the adults concerned would not be deprived of their liberty for the purpose of Article 5 and thus the CCG would not be required to make an application to court for a welfare order under section 16 MCA 2005.

The Official Solicitor was invited to act for the four adults originally involved in the test case.  Two were not eligible for legal aid and it was not considered reasonable to utilise P’s funds for this purpose.  Subsequently one of these cases could proceed and the CCG applied to withdraw its application because the practical impact would be very limited; the CCG had reviewed its position in light of the OS’ analysis and the CCG considered that both the relevance and the strength of the application had been limited by the Law Commission’s proposed reforms.  The Official Solicitor sought his costs, submitting that in reality the application was akin to a civil claim where he had succeeded.

Baker J refused the application.  He gave no weight to the argument that the costs would be borne by the public purse in the form of the Legal Aid Agency stating that a legally aided party should be treated in exactly the same way as one without a legal aid certificate.  He rejected the application for costs in these terms:

 

(1) I do not accept the suggestion that this was not a typical welfare case. The application concerned a series of welfare cases in which an important preliminary issue arose on a point of law.(2) As is widely recognised, the law concerning deprivation of liberty under the Mental Capacity Act is in a state of some uncertainty. That is why it has been the subject of a review by the Law Commission whose final report contains recommendations for substantial reform. The government has now accepted the report and the majority of its recommendations, and acknowledged that the current Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards should be replaced “as a matter of pressing urgency” (see government response 14 March 2018).

(3) It was in my judgment understandable that the applicant sought guidance on the issue of the impact of the “acid test” on cases involving incapacitated adults living at home, given the large number of individuals in those circumstances for whom it is responsible. In the words of rule 159(2)(b), it was reasonable for the applicant to raise and pursue this issue.

(4) Given the constraints under which all public bodies operate, the applicant was entirely justified in keeping under review the question of whether to pursue the case. Indeed, it would have been remiss if it had not done so. The fact that the applicant decided to abort the proceedings was a reasonable decision. To use the words in rule 159(2)(b) again, it was reasonable for the applicant to decide not to contest the issue in the light of developments in the litigation as described above.

(5) Although it is arguable that the difficulties in the individual cases could have been anticipated, I do not think that the applicant’s failure to do so at an earlier stage could be described as litigation conduct of the sort to justify departing from the general rule.

(6) Although my comments in G v E (Costs) above were made in a different context, they do have some relevance here. Professionals working in this field often face difficult judgements and decisions. The applicant made the decision to ask the court to consider the preliminary issue which, as Mr Ruck Keene fairly conceded, involved propositions of general and considerable importance. Subsequently, however, in the light of developments within the cases, the applicant decided not to pursue the issue. In all the circumstances, I do not consider that its decision-making and overall conduct justifies a departure from the general rule as to costs.

Comment:  This is a useful application of the principles concerning costs to an unusual situation namely where an important preliminary issue arises in a “typical welfare case”.  Key to this was the judge’s assessment that it was reasonable for the CCG to seek guidance about the applicability of Article 5 given the significant financial impact in a time of financial constraints had the CCG been successful; but that it was also reasonable to keep the need for the proceedings under review and to seek to withdraw them when the issue, although fascinating, had become academic.

Guest Post by Zena Soormally on the duties of ALRs

We’re very pleased to include this post by Simpson Millar’s Zena Soormally, which summarises the guidance from the Law Society on the role of ALRS.

“Having read the new Law Society Practice note on Accredited Legal Representatives (“ALRs”), I thought I’d summarise a little of what I now understand the role to entail and my thoughts for the views of those who are interested. Please note that you can only access the note if you are registered with the Law Society and, even when you do access it, it has the usual status of guidance from the Law Society, it is not binding:

  • If you act as ALR, P will be understood to be your client (notwithstanding that ALRs are appointed by the court so you won’t have your usual solicitor/client relationship)
  • If the court wishes to appoint you as an ALR (where you are accredited by the Law Society) the court needs your permission before you are so appointed – so there will be scope to work out your case load obligations at the time and funding issues (although there doesn’t appear to be any guidance about the ramifications, if any, if you refuse to take a case a number of times)
  • The ALR invitation can be made on courts own initiative or on application
  • The COP has to consider, as with all cases, at the start, whether an ALR should be appointed, or whether P should participate in some other way (Rule 3A) – generally that will be, in summary (1) ALR, (2) LF, (3) Rule 3A Rep, or some other direction
  • The Law Society Guidance suggests that the following cases are likely to require a litigation friend, not an ALR: where

o   expert evidence is needed – arguably quite a lot of cases will fall in to this category

o   the case is “complex” – although no definition or guidance is given to define what ‘complexity’ will look like

o   there are a wide range of issues to consider, and

o   the case involves 16-18 year olds who are a party

  • In other cases, a Rule 3A rep might fit the bill better.
  • In many cases, it’s possible that no representative of P at all will be needed, as is the case is non contentious – e.g. COP Property and Affairs cases
  • It is more likely that an ALR will be appointed if issues are relatively defined.
  • It may be that you will be appointed as ALR at first but then need a litigation friend as case becomes more complex or contentious. It will be up to the litigation friend whether they then instruct the ALR as solicitor going forward, although I can see benefits of that.
  • Once appointed as ALR, the usual processes follow as if you were a solicitor, as far as I can tell – e.g. see client, obtain and consider docs etc.
  • The COP’s list of ALRs will be updated monthly. It is up to the COP how it will allocate those cases and, as far as the guidance says, there is likely to be regional differences in approach, which will no doubt cause some issues for lawyers in practice while transition takes place to the new approach.
  • The guidance provides interesting guidance in relation to client care letters: P will be the ALR’s client but anyone acting as ALR will need to consider putting together an appropriate client care letter in line with the guidance and the SRA Code. If it is inappropriate to send a letter, ALRs will be expected to retain a copy on file with a note explaining why it wasn’t appropriate to send one.
  • ALR’s must adhere to SRA code of conduct, as would be expected.
  • ALR’s are not expected to send anyone else in their place to meet with P (which makes sense and must, in my view, be right, but which some senior solicitors may struggle with, if they routinely send out junior staff for client meetings, rather than attending in person).
  • ALRs will need to make sure,

o   as they already should , that they have regard to, and implement, Mr Justice Charles’ guidance on the Participation of P, and

o   even if you are unfamiliar with it now, that you have read the guidance re Rule 11 (7) (B) rules for MHT work, as there is overlap specifically mentioned in the guidance.

  • As with a litigation friend, the role of ALR is to put forward a case in P’s best interests, not always just what P wants, although you must always make P’s wishes and feelings clear. Whatever happens, if you are unsure what to do, the advice appears, sensibly, to be that you should make an application to the COP (on notice or not) under Rule 148A to seek guidance.
  • Solicitor ALR’s can conduct own advocacy in COP but you can also instruct Counsel if you wish – although, as always, they must have the right experience.
  • The duties to your ‘client’ section of the guidance, including the sections on confidentiality, disclosure and privilege, cause me some concern, given the practice of preparing notes of visits to P, where they lack capacity to conduct proceedings, and reporting everything said to the COP by way of witness statement: I am not sure, in practice, how the balance will be struck under the ALR role, where there is no client to seek instructions from on the issue of whether something should be withheld from the statement or not. In practice, it may result in further applications to the COP for guidance, until the case law has developed to provide that guidance.
  • Funding: this is still a pain as far as I can see but the updated information is helpful. Essentially, as I understand it, it works as if you are a litigation friend, save that you have to ask the LAA to exercise its discretion under Regulation 30 (5) to waive the need for a signature on the LAA forms. However, that doesn’t help the fact that you can only get legal aid if P is a party, wishes to be joined as a party and/or is contemplating proceedings. None of those will apply to a lot of the ALR cases, so, I imagine, that means that LAA funding will not be available unless P is, in practice, a party. That may, in effect, just mean that, until the funding issues are resolved, P will be routinely joined as a party, with an ALR. All the other usual LAA rules apply as do the usual rules with regards to private funding and/or seeking undertakings on costs from the relevant public body if legal aid isn’t available.
  • Non LAA practitioners can become ALRs but they cannot accept cases where P is, or may be, eligible for legal aid. The borderline eligibility cases and/or those where P isn’t eligible but will be in the near future (perhaps because of built up savings) will no doubt therefore, need to go to LAA practitioners only).
  • There will be some lag between being invited to act as ALR, and actually being able to accept, because of the work needed to establish LAA eligibility. You will not have funding to carry out that work, so we will be taking over the role, which the OS usually has to deal with, to investigate eligibility without funding being it place – that may, in some of these cases, require a number of letters and calls, which isn’t appealing, but isn’t always too onerous.
  • The guidance specifically reminds ALRs to be mindful of advising/taking forward any linked issues with regards to judicial review and/or damages claims BUT note that as ALR you have no magic status to take such a matter forward and, as in cases now, you would no doubt need to approach someone (perhaps the OS) to act as litigation friend in those other non COP cases if you see something that needs to be progressed. I imagine, if an ALR case became a case that required linked involvement from the OS as litigation friend, the OS would also see good reason to act as litigation friend in the ALR case.
  • Don’t forget to have regard to the case of Re RD when dealing with s21A cases, in the usual way.”

ALRs Are Go!

Congratulations to the first cohort of accredited legal representatives (ALRs) who have been approved by the Law Society.   You can find details about the Law Society’s Mental Capacity (Welfare) Accreditation Scheme here.

Those who have been awarded the status of ALR can now be appointed directly by the Court of Protection under Rule 3A.  Rule 3A (2) (b) allows the Court to direct that:

“P’s participation should be secured by the appointment of an accredited legal representative to represent P in the proceedings and to discharge such other functions as the court may direct”.

Rule 3 A makes it clear that the court has to give thought in every case to how P should take part in the case. It gives the court a menu of options of which the ALR is one. The factors the court should consider when deciding which of the options to select include:

“(a)the nature and extent of the information before the court;

(b)the issues raised in the case;

(c)whether a matter is contentious; and

(d)whether P has been notified in accordance with the provisions of Part 7 and what, if anything, P has said or done in response to such notification.”

Practice Direction 2A provides some further guidance at paragraphs 9-10:

  1. An accredited legal representative is defined in Rule 6. When such representatives exist one can be appointed whether or not P is joined as a party and this may be of assistance if urgent orders are needed, particularly if they are likely to have an impact on the final orders (e.g. an urgent order relating to residence).
  1. When P lacks capacity to conduct the proceedings and is made a party an accredited legal representative is not intended as a substitute for a litigation friend, but as an alternative in a suitable case (or in the early stages of the case).

No doubt caselaw will develop as to the proper use of ALRs.  So far we are aware of two references to their use in reported cases: HSE v PD [2015] EWCOP 48 (at [35]) and Re JM [2016] EWCOP 15 (at [30]).  In both cases, the court was concerned with the potential use of ALRs in cases where P has not been joined as a party.

However the appointment of an ALR is also as we have seen a possible alternative to a litigation friend in an appropriate case.  There seems no reason why an ALR should not be proactive in, for example, a Section 21A application where a solicitor who is a member of the ALR scheme has been approached either by P or an RPR.   In such a case the solicitor  may consider filing a witness statement confirming their accreditation, describing their interaction with P and explaining why this could be a suitable case for P to participate through the appointment of an ALR rather than via a litigation friend.  Our precedent for a first directions order in a section 21A includes provision for the appointment of an ALR.

 

Cardiff Research on Welfare Cases in the COP.

Once again we are all indebted to Cardiff Law School for further research about the use of the Court of Protection in welfare cases.   Their full report can be found here, and the executive summary here.

We hope you will find time to read the report but set out below the authors’ key findings:

  • Unlike its predecessor jurisdiction in the Family Division of the High Court, the work of the CoP leans more strongly towards social welfare questions such as where a person lives and how they are cared for than medical treatment. Local authorities are now the main users of the CoP’s welfare jurisdiction – they are involved more frequently in CoP litigation than NHS organisations.
  • Cases about relationships – who a person has contact with, and whether they have the mental capacity to consent to sex or marriage – are among the most complex in the CoP’s jurisdiction.  They typically involve more parties and hearings, take longer and cost more than other kinds of case.
  • We estimate that a typical welfare case in the CoP can cost local authorities around £13,000, but found examples of cases costing considerably more than this. The cost to public authorities of welfare litigation in the CoP may have a chilling effect on their willingness to refer disputes to court where appropriate. For P and families who do not qualify for legal aid, the cost of litigation may be a major barrier to accessing justice.
  • We found little evidence that P or families were using the CoP’s main personal welfare jurisdiction to challenge decisions made under the MCA; in our sample it served primarily as a vehicle for public bodies to seek authorisation for best interests decisions. However, the procedure for asking the court to review a deprivation of liberty safeguards authorisation provided a vehicle for P and others to challenge assessments that they lacked mental capacity, or best interests decisions, about a wide range of matters including: disputes about serious medical treatment, contact with friends or family, and consent to sex or marriage. We raise concerns that recent rulings by the Court of Appeal may close down the only realistically available route into the CoP’s welfare jurisdiction for these fundamental human rights matters.
  • We found few indications that P was routinely participating in CoP welfare proceedings. We hope that following the introduction of new rules on participation this picture has changed since our research took place.

The Court of Appeal and the limits of s21A

The Court of Appeal has upheld the appeal by the Director of Legal Aid Casework against the decision of Charles J that an application for the Court of Protection to determine whether life-sustaining treatment was in the best interests of Paul Briggs was properly made under s21A MCA 2005.

You can read the judgment here. The findings as to the scope of s21A will be of importance as will the comments about when an application to the court is required in relation to life-sustaining treatment.

Two applications were befor Charles J: one brought by the NHS Trust providing treatment for Mr Brigss in order to resolve whether such treatment was in his best interests; the other by Mrs Briggs, as her husband’s RPR, under s21A MCA. As the Court of Appeal noted Mrs Briggs made it clear from the start that the reason for using s21A as a vehicle was because this would allow her access to non-means tested legal aid. Without this she would have been unable to secure representation or marshall the evidence which she and Mr Briggs’ family and friends were able to provide and which was determinative in satisfying Charles J that Mr Briggs, if capacitous, would not have wanted treatment to continue.

The Court of Appeal noted the breadth of s21A which allows the court to determine “any question relating to

a) whether the relevant person meets one or more of the qualifying requirements;

(b) the period during which the standard authorisation is to be in force;

(c) the purpose for which the standard authorisation is given;

(d) the conditions subject to which the standard authorisation is given.”

However having regard to the context of s21A and the guides to its construction through the explanatory notes Lady Justice King held:

“88. In my judgment, regardless of whether the amendments to the Act went beyond that which was absolutely necessary in order to fill the Bournewood Gap, I am entirely satisfied that the provisions were not intended to, and do not, provide a duplicate route by which personal welfare decisions and in particular medical treatment decisions, can be made in circumstances where the deprivation of liberty itself is not the real or essential issue before the court.

89. In my judgment therefore, when considered against the structure of the Act together with the Code of Practice and Explanatory notes, Section 21A relates to decisions about the deprivation of liberty and not, as suggested by the judge, to the circumstances which lead up to the deprivation of liberty. Sch. 1A para.16 to my mind is clear that each of the conditions which have to be satisfied relate directly to whether it is necessary, proportionate and in the best interests of P to be detained.

90. It is important also to remember that ‘best interests’ is not a concept in the abstract. Anchored to the principle of ‘best interests’ found in section 1 MCA, is the fact that every decision made in relation to an incapacitated person under the MCA (whether deprived of their liberty or not) will be made through the prism of their best interests. The Act is decision specific – in the same way that the ‘functional test’ found at section 3 of the Act requires the determination of whether a person is unable to make a particular decision, (with the result that it is recognised that a person may have the capacity to make some decisions and not others). It follows that a consideration of what is in a person’s best interests in relation to any aspect of the Act must be considered in relation to the specific decision to be made.

91. Schedule A1 para. 16 sets out the best interests requirement where a person is, or is about to be, a detained resident. The three further conditions to be met, (as already identified) are that:

(3) . . . it is in the best interests of the relevant person for him to be detained

(4) . . . In order to prevent harm to the person, it is necessary for him to be a detained resident

(5) It is a proportionate response . . . for him to be a detained resident. 

(My emphasis)

In my judgment, para.16 is clearly geared to a particular decision namely whether it is in the best interests of P to be a detained resident. This decision specific application of the best interests principle dovetails with the DOLS Code of Practice which says that:

“….it is not the best interests assessor’s role to specify conditions that do not directly relate to the issue of deprivation of liberty”

And

“A deprivation of liberty authorisation – whether urgent or standard – relates solely to the issue of deprivation of liberty”

92. In my judgment, a question in relation to serious medical treatment is not fundamentally a question in relation to deprivation of liberty. The issue before the court, as was accepted by the judge, was whether P should or should not be given certain medical treatment. It may be that following the making of such a decision there will be implications in relation to P’s liberty as was recognised by the judge. For example: there may have to be a deprivation of liberty to prevent a woman from leaving the labour ward in circumstances where she lacks capacity and refuses a caesarean section which is clinically indicated and in her best interests. In my view, in such circumstances, the deprivation of liberty is secondary. The real question is whether it is in her best interests to have the surgery, whether or not it is in her best interests to be deprived of her liberty is then determined against the backdrop of the decision in relation to the proposed serious medical treatment. In my judgment that makes the appropriate application an application made under s.15 – s.17 MCA and not an application under s21A.”

King LJ rejected – perhaps unsurprisingly – the submission of the Legal Aid Agency that s21A should be constructed narrowly and that all that is required for the purpose of schedule A1 is for the assessors to be satisfied that there is a care plan and a needs assessment in place. She made the following important comment:

” 93. Having said that, in my judgment. Mr Nicholls has sought to place too narrow a scope on Sch. A1. There are many issues which relate to a deprivation of liberty which need appropriately to be considered by the assessor and which may be reflected in recommendations for conditions in the assessor’s report and which may even be determinative of whether a standard authorisation is made.

94.Where a dispute is referred to the court under s.21A, the issue is often in relation to P and the family’s wish for P to go home, set against the assessor’s view that it is in P’s best interests to be placed in a care home and consequently deprived of his or her liberty. Miss Richards has helpfully provided the court with a table of cases where applications have appropriately been made under s.21A; on closer examination, each of them has involved a dispute as to whether P should reside in some form of care home or return to either his home or to live with a family member in the community. Such cases are focused specifically on the issue as to whether P should be detained and are properly brought under s21A. Proper consideration of those cases by the assessor in compliance with the guidance in the DOLS Code, requires far more of an extensive consideration of the relevant circumstances than that which is suggested by Mr Nicholls, namely simply ensuring a care plan and needs assessment is in place without further consideration as to the content.

95.Contact, for example, is an issue capable of going to the heart of whether being detained is in a person’s best interests; it may be that in an ideal world P’s best interests would be served by a deprivation of liberty in the form of her living in a care home properly looked after, where the appropriate medication regime will be adhered to and P will have a proper balanced diet. Desirable as that may be, and such a regime may well provide the optimum care outcome for P, but it may also be the case that unless, regular contact can be facilitated to a particular family member, the distress and confusion caused to P would be such that it would be no longer in her best interests to be detained, and that what might amount to sub optimum physical care would ultimately be preferable to no, or insufficient contact. The weighing up of such options are part of the best interests assessment process in relation to which the professionals who are eligible to be assessors are peculiarly qualified to conduct.”

In Mr Briggs’ case therefore

“99……there was no live issue for determination under s.21A in relation to the deprivation of liberty, there was however a ‘life and death’ personal welfare issue to be decided under ss.15-17 of the Act.

 

King LJ went on the say that following Ferreira v HM Senior Coroner for Inner South London and Others [2017] EWCA Civ 31

108. The proper approach to a case where the central issue is medical treatment (serious or otherwise) following Ferreirais therefore as follows:

i) If the medical treatment proposed is not in dispute, then, regardless of whether it involves the withdrawal of treatment from a person who is minimally conscious or in a persistent vegetative state, it is a decision as to what treatment is in P’s best interests and can be taken by the treating doctors who then have immunity pursuant to section 5 MCA

ii) If there is a dispute in relation to medical treatment of an incapacitated person, and, specifically, where there is a doubt as to whether CANH should be withdrawn, then the matter should be referred to the court for a personal welfare determination under sections 15-17 MCA.

iii) Where, as a consequence of receiving life saving treatment, P is unable to leave hospital, that is not a deprivation of liberty which falls foul of Article 5(1). A standard authorisation is not therefore required and any application in relation to treatment will properly be made under s.16 MCA.

iv) If, as a consequence of ensuring that P receives the treatment that is in his or her best interests, P will become subjected to a deprivation of liberty of a type that falls within Article 5(1), then there must be authorisation for that deprivation of liberty:

a) If already in hospital or in care. under Schedule A1 (or S4A(5)): or

b) Pursuant to a court order under section 4A(3) MCA.

v) The Sch. A1 decision will be made pursuant to para. 16 on the basis that the proposed deprivation of liberty is in P’s best interests, necessary and proportionate; conditions of the type envisaged by the DOLS Code of Practice can be recommended if necessary.

“vi) If there is a disagreement as to whether there should be a standard authorisation, or in relation to the conditions attached to such an authorisation, then the matter can be brought to by way of an application under s.21A to determine any question relating to the authorisation and to make any appropriate order varying or terminating the authorisation. Clinical issues in relation to treatment will remain in the hands of the treating physicians.”

 

Earlier in her judgment King LJ had commented that PD 9E appears to be in conflict with the Code of Practice in requiring all cases concerning the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from a person in a persistent vegetative state or a minimally conscious state. The passage above is consistent with her comment that the Code should take precedence.

 

Leveson LJ added

“114. It is not for the court to identify how legal aid funds should be distributed but it may be appropriate to underline the difficulties that families such as the family in this case must face, addressing difficult issues at acutely traumatic times in their lives. If agreement between the authorities and the family is possible, litigation will not be necessary but, if there is disagreement, the resulting issues are likely to be complex both as to the facts and the law. Assuming that the merits of any particular proceedings can be demonstrated, consideration should be given to the public interest justification of adding financial pressures to the many others that the affected families face.”

There is much to consider in this judgment  It is not known whether many other medical treatment cases have been brought under s21A since Charles’ judgment. The prime reason for using the mechanism of s21A in Mr Briggs’ case was that it was the only way of ensuring that his family were able to participate fully in the application.

 

It is important that the Court’s recognition that the best interests assessment for DOLS may engage a range of issues is reflected both in DOLS decision-making and in legal aid funding decisions.

 

Once again this highlights the unsatisfactory result of the restrictions on non-means tested legal aid (Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) Regulations 2013/480, Regulation 5). Some patients in hospital lacking capacity to make critical decisions will have access to non-means tested legal aid: others will not. Equally a person lacking capacity deprived of his liberty in a care home under DOLS will have access to non-means tested legal aid: but if the care home re-registers as a supported living placement delivering the same care package, the resident will need to satisfy a means test.   Parents who face care proceedings in relation to a child with learning disabilities would receive non-means tested legal aid: but would have to satisfy a means test to get legal aid to resist an application by the same statutory body to remove the same child once he or she is over 16 and lacks capacity for the purpose of the MCA. Amongst other matters this case illustrates the misery and potential injustice caused by such anomalies.

Damages for false imprisonment: an example from immigration detention

Court of Protection practitioners may be interested in the successful challenge by Godwin Chaparadza to actions by the SSHD including, materially for our purposes although only one aspect of his successful claim, much of which is outside the scope of this post, challenges to the lawfulness of his detention between 11 April 2014 and 20 June 2014.

Mr Chaparadza had entered the UK as a student in 2004 and applied for his leave to be varied outside the immigration rules in 2011.  This had the effect of extending his leave to remain pending the decision on that application and any appeal.  The Home Secretary refused the application but did not notify Mr Chaparadza.  When in 2013 he was arrested for driving without insurance and obstruction, he was treated as an overstayer; he applied for asylum and was rejected and after he exhausted his rights to appeal he was detained while reporting in April 2014.   The Home Secretary refused to treat his further submissions as a fresh claim and he sought judicial review of, amongst other matters, the failure to comply with the notice requirement of the 2011 decision and the lawfulness of his detention.

In (very brief) summary the court found that the failure to notify Mr Chaparadza of the refusal of his application in 2011 meant that the refusal itself was of no effect: this triggered the extension of his leave and therefore there was no basis to detain him in April 2014.   The detention was, therefore, unlawful.  The Home Secretary argued that this was a technical error: the judge disagreed.  Reviewing the scope of damages for unlawful detention he awarded Mr Chaparadza £3,500 for the first 3 days on the basis of what he accepted was the shock of being detained and £7,000 for the remainder of the two month period, on the basis that Mr Chaparadza suffered no lasting harm.

In many cases where unlawful detention of P comes to light it will not be possible to demonstrate the tort of false imprisonment which involves is “the unlawful imposition of constraint on another’s freedom of movement from a particular place” (Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1172 at 1178.)  However for those cases where this can be shown there is much to learn from the awards of damages in other jurisdictions.